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*For publisher*  
 Vladimir Popović

*Editors in Chief*  
 Vladimir Popović  
 Velimir Ćurgus Kazimir

*Editorial staff*  
 Milana Brisić  
 Vladimir Abramović  
 Aleksandra Milićević  
 Marija Benke

*Cover design and prepress*  
 Pavle Farčić

*Print*  
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
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# Introduction

VELIMIR ČURGUS KAZIMIR

## INTRODUCTION:

### The development of media hybrids

The beginning of 2017 was marked by presidential elections. This has not only had a direct impact on the number of analyzed texts, of which we had about 25 percent more than in the same period last year, but also on the increased presence of the topic *Political life in Serbia*, although the media interest in this area was intense in the past as well. One can get the impression that the political tensions in Serbia are maintained mostly due to the media and the image they create, either in the preparation for an election campaign or during the campaign itself.

Of course, what is happening around us, both in the region and in the world, produces occasional “chain reactions” in the media. In the beginning of January, the arrest of Ramush Haradinaj in France, after the issuing of Serbian arrest warrant, initiated at a large number of negative articles in relation to Kosovo and other stakeholders.

Intense media presence of the new American President Donald Trump is causing a lot more attention and comments. In this sense, Trump seems to have “pushed out” Vladimir Putin from the Serbian media. Sensationalism and his unexpected decisions attract media in a special way. Negative or positive connotation, it is no longer relevant.

In this quarter, there were about six times more negative texts than the positive ones. Such a “downpour” of criticism is certainly a result of the political campaign. Newspapers are taking sides. Some very openly, others a little more cautiously. Since everything is in the service of the campaign, it is easy to mix topics and motives. It is often very difficult to spot this “hybrid” ... Whether it is about policy, current events, personal stories, economy, society? The sources of such stories are often not sufficiently transparent, traceable and are indeed, severely hazy.

It is difficult to remain neutral in the mixture of one and all. There could be no talk about objectivity, i.e. balance. The newspapers practically create themselves! Of course, accompanied by general narrative about truth and honesty.

As in the previous eight calendar quarters, the same methodological apparatus was applied in the analysis of the empirical data. A single text was chosen for the subject of analysis. Analysis itself represents the combination of two research methods: (a) content analysis, which was guided by a „specific theoretical and hypothetical frame... creating an objective and systopic empirical collection of the social communication content, which enables the formation of relevant conclusions about the social context in which the communication takes part,”<sup>1</sup> and (b) a discourse analysis which enabled us to understand various, epistemologically and methodologically immeasurable,<sup>2</sup> authors’ interpretative strategies and editorial policies which reflect perceptions of different, primarily ideological and political, discourse realities, by analyzing their specific discourse meanings.

In the interpretative sense, in order to offer better coherence of the text, the analysis is, as in the previous reports, divided into two wholes which refer to: (a) analysis of quantitative indicators collected using content analysis, and (b) discourse analysis of the qualitative content excerpted from texts which were included in the research sample.

(Endnotes)

1 S. Gredelj, *S onu stranu ogledala* [On the other side of the mirror], Belgrade news: Istraživačko-izdavački centar SSO Srbije, 1986, 19

2 G. Couvalis, *The Philosophy of Science*, London, Sage Publications, 1997.



Sample

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN


## Sample

As stated in earlier publications, the basic idea of the project *Mediameter* is to try to reconstruct media reality of the dailies in Serbia, the way it can be defined considering the texts that are positioned (wholly or partially) on front pages, as various reflections of current political events and circumstances in both Serbia and the world. A sample of the dailies was composed considering two selection criteria – the largest circulation and reputation of the print media. Daily newspaper circulation data were taken from a research done by IPSOS.<sup>1</sup> The front page is the part of the dailies that the readers connect the most with the identity/recognition of a media outlet. It is often responsible for the first impression, our potential affection or repulsion formed about some printed media. The front page comes into contact not only with the readers of that particular paper, but also the people who will perhaps never touch that paper. Through newspaper and TV advertising and shop windows, the front page reaches a wider auditorium than that forming the readers of individual dailies. The front pages, hence form, in a certain way, the public image of the newspaper which symbolizes its editorial policy, evaluative orientation and targeting of certain audiences. On account of the above-mentioned reasons, the front pages of dailies from our sample were in the focus of analysis of the project *Mediameter*.

Texts from front pages reflect best the coordinates of editorial policies of daily print editions. Though this involves a small percentage of texts, editorial identity of a daily can be most easily identified through messages conveyed through front pages. The ratio of the total number of texts in each daily individually and the number of texts from the front pages that were included in the sample of our research are shown in the charts 1-7, for the period from 1st January to 31st March 2017.


<sup>1</sup> Research of the average scope of the daily print media was done for the period from May 3<sup>rd</sup> 2016 to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2016, population: total individuals

Chart 1. – *Večernje novosti*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Chart 2. – *Informer*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017


**Chart 3. – Alo!**



**Chart 5. – Politika**



**Chart 4. – Blic**



**Chart 6. – Danas**







Chart 7. – Kurir



The total number of analysed texts considering all seven media that are included in our research sample is 2403 and that number accounts for averagely 72.75% texts from front pages and for 4.52% of the total number of texts.

Table 1 – Večernje novosti

Media outlet Večernje novosti / section	Total number of front- page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front- page texts that were not selected
chronicle	70	31	39
society	83	77	6
politics	133	133	0
economics	52	52	0
current affairs	49	35	14
reportage	34	13	21
culture	21	8	13
interview	19	13	6
world	19	13	6
sport	11	1	10
Belgrade news	11	9	2
supplement	1	0	1
reflector	3	1	2
show business	0	0	0
remembrance	4	4	0
entrepreneur	1	1	0
real-life stories	1	0	1
region	0	0	0
feuilleton	0	0	0
action	1	1	0
confessions	0	0	0
topic of the day	2	2	0
event of the day	2	2	0
in memoriam	1	0	1
Belgrade stories	2	0	2
Novosti award	1	0	1
Culture supple- ment	1	0	1
Weather	1	0	1
event	4	4	0

other side	1	1	0
Christmas supplement	1	1	0
research	3	3	0
elections	26	26	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>431</b>	<b>127</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 2. – Informer**

Media outlet: Informer / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
breaking news	164	160	4
news	100	60	40
showtime	59	4	55
entertainment	0	0	0
sport	46	2	44
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>369</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>143</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 3. – Alo!**

Media outlet: Alo! / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
current affairs	86	84	2
news	204	135	69
v.i.p.	103	7	96
sport	37	2	35
world	2	1	1
interview of the week	1	1	0
interview	1	1	0
politics	2	2	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>203</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 4. – Blic**

Media outlet: Blic / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
series	4	4	0
current affairs/ interview	6	6	0
reportage	1	0	1
society	70	47	23
society/economics	2	2	0
Belgrade news	1	0	1
chronicle	41	23	18
culture	10	3	7
politics	142	142	0
sport	47	4	43
real-life stories	7	0	7
world	13	11	2
topic of the day	78	76	2
people	1	1	0
Pop and culture	5	2	3
entertainment	44	3	41
50 most powerful	1	1	0
dossier	2	2	0
economics	6	6	0
guest	1	1	0
interview	1	1	0
planet	1	1	0
talk of the week	1	1	0
topic	4	4	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>341</b>	<b>148</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 5. – Politika**

Media outlet: Politika / section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
world	37	28	9
society	51	24	27
economics	25	24	1
politics	16	16	0
event of the day	12	9	3
culture	25	3	22
chronicle	21	14	7
daily supplement	1	0	1
Belgrade news	8	3	5
Serbia	19	8	11
readers' club	10	0	10
sport	16	1	15
topic of the week	30	29	1
personalities	3	1	2
region	6	6	0
front page	293	292	1
spectre	11	0	11
views	0	0	0
last night in Belgrade	1	1	0
feuilleton	2	0	2
consumer	9	8	1
Belgrade events	8	5	3
child	1	1	0
colorful page	1	0	1
culture supplement	2	0	2
culture, art and science	9	3	6
Children supplement	1	0	1
dossier	1	0	1
topic of the day	3	3	0
Christmas supplement	1	1	0
weather	5	0	5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>628</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>148</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 6. – Danas**

Danas/section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
business supplement	16	14	2
Special supplement	32	26	6
Danas weekend	28	20	8
event of the day	0	0	0
society	76	73	3
economics	40	39	1
globe	22	19	3
culture	38	16	22
interview	3	3	0
front page	57	57	0
health	0	0	0
politics	112	112	0
Novi Sad	0	0	0
Belgrade news	5	5	0
topic of the day	1	1	0
sport	12	5	7
topic	11	11	0
scales	0	0	0
pomodoro	2	1	1
dialogue	7	6	1
other side	1	1	0
election fever	17	17	0
periscope	2	2	0
last page	6	6	0
Sandžak	1	1	0
suočavanje	1	1	0
Vojvodina	1	1	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>437</b>	<b>54</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017


**Table 7. – Kurir**

Kurir/section	Total number of front-page texts	Total number of selected front-page texts	Total number of front-page texts that were not selected
news	3	3	0
chronicle	55	38	17
culture	5	1	4
topic of the day	1	1	0
planet	10	10	0
sport	6	3	3
stars	59	14	45
interview	8	8	0
politics	170	170	0
society	11	4	7
Belgrade	1	0	1
busines	3	3	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>77</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017


By reviewing the presented tables 1-7, it is still noticeable that the structures of dailies follow two different patterns. In other words, *Večernje novosti*, *Politics*, *Danas* and *Blic* follow the traditional structure of daily newspapers, while *Kurir* once again joins this group of media during first quarter of 2017. Newspapers *Informer* and *Alo!* deviate from this matrix to a considerable extent, as in previous trimesters. In these two publications, *news* are the dominant section, uniting different areas, while special attention is paid to entertaining content, like information about celebrities, then show business and sport, which increasingly gain social and political character. Editorial strategies that were established in the previous six editions of Mediameter are entirely visible in the first quarter of 2017, as it may be clearly seen in Charts 8-14.

**Chart 8. – Večernje novosti**




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Chart 9. – Informer**




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Chart 10. – *Alo!*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Chart 11. – *Blic*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Chart 12. – *Politics*




Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Chart 13. – *Danas*



Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Chart 14. – Kurir



Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

If we compare the number of selected texts in the period January – March 2017, 2016 and 2015, we can note a multiple increase of the sample size. In the first quarter of 2017 a total of 1043 texts (76.69%) more have been selected, compared to the same period of 2015. In comparison with 2016, the number of selected text is increased by 479 or 24.9%, regardless of the same number of holidays.<sup>1</sup> Also, the number of selected texts for period January – March 2017 is also the highest in comparison to all other observed trimesters (see table). The actual increase in comparison to previous quarter<sup>2</sup> is 6.75% or 152 texts, which is especially interesting, bearing in mind the number of holidays (see footnote 2). Although the increase could be explained by presidential election,<sup>3</sup> which occupied significant space on the front pages, this increase is initiated by events concerning Kosovo (arrest of Ramush Haradinai, initiative to form Kosovo army), inauguration of the new president of USA Donald Trump, or, in general, by growing complexity of both internal and external socio-political circumstances.

1 In all three mentioned periods (2015, 2016, 2017) a triple issue for 31<sup>st</sup> December and 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> January were published, as well as double issues for 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> January as well as for 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> February.

2 In which the highest number of texts that are processed in relation to all the previous editions of Mediameter are recorded.

3 Election campaign for parliamentary elections in 2016 has contributed to the increase of number of texts in first and second quarter of previous year, compared to the same period of 2015. For this reason, it is not possible to attribute drastic increase of number of texts in first quarter of 2017 exclusively to the topic of presidential elections.

Table 8. – Number of selected texts by quarter

Time period	2015	2016	2017.
First quarter	1360	1924	2403
Second quarter	1673	2106	
Third quarter	2172	2012	
Fourth quarter	2177	2251	
TOTAL	7382	8293	

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

# 3



## Research Results

ISIDORA JARIĆ, DANICA LABAN

## RESEARCH RESULTS

### The prominence of journalistic genres

In the first calendar quarter of 2017, the report is once again the most prominent journalistic form in the sample texts in all of the seven analyzed media, while the prominence of this journalistic taking up 71.49% or 1718 articles this time. The largest percentage of reports has again been recorded in *Informer* – 92.92%, while the smallest percentage of this genre is recorded in *Politika* – 60.83%, which is almost identical to the findings of the previous quarter. The second most prominent form is the news article, making up a total 11.4% of written articles. The largest percentage of news articles is this time recorded in *Politika*, 22.08%, while this time the daily newspaper *Danas* had the greatest number of texts (61); at the same time, the least number is recorded in *Informer* (6 or 2.65%). The next most prominent genre is the commentary (4.37%), with the largest presence being in *Danas* (11.44%), while the newspapers *Kurir* had no articles in this form. The presence of actual news on the front pages has decreased for each quarter so that only 2.33% or 56 analyzed texts were written in this form – the highest number appearing in *Večernje novosti* (4.64%). In the analyzed daily newspapers there were also 27 coverages, representing only 1.12% of articles found in the sample (see more in the tables). In relation to the previous quarters, the order of how prominent each genre is, has remained unchanged in the fourth quarter.

**Table 9.** – Individual prominence of genres in the seven sampled media

Genre	Total number	%
report	1718	71.49
News article	274	11.4
interview	204	8.49
commentary	105	4.37
News	56	2.33
coverage	27	1.12
other forms	19	0.79
total	2403	100

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 10.** – Distribution of journalistic forms in the sample texts, according to the media

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total
report	87.55	79.18	61.33	92.92	75.29	60.83	65.43	71.49
News article	0.00	0.29	8.24	0.00	16.08	22.08	20.88	11.40
interview	8.58	11.44	13.96	2.65	7.45	7.08	5.80	8.49
commentary	1.29	4.40	11.44	0.88	0.00	7.08	0.23	4.37
News	1.72	3.81	1.60	3.10	0.78	0.63	4.64	2.33
reportage	0.00	0.00	0.69	0.00	0.39	2.29	2.78	1.12
other forms	0.86	0.88	2.75	0.44	0.00	0.00	0.23	0.79
total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 11.** – Prominence of journalistic forms in the sample texts, according to the media

Genre	<i>Alo!</i>	<i>Blic</i>	<i>Danas</i>	<i>Informer</i>	<i>Kurir</i>	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	total
report	204	270	268	210	192	292	282	1718
News article	0	1	36	0	41	106	90	274
interview	20	39	61	6	19	34	25	204
commentary	3	15	50	2	0	34	1	105
News	4	13	7	7	2	3	20	56
reportage	0	0	3	0	1	11	12	27
other forms	2	3	12	1	0	0	1	19
total	233	341	437	226	255	480	431	2403

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017



**Topics**

In order for each article to be defined as clearly as possible, the selected writings that make up the sample are classified under a single topic, but nevertheless, all relevant elements present in these articles have been accounted for. This gave us a clearer insight into the manner of how the news is provided and into the approach of the media to certain topics in the previous issues of the *Mediameter* too. In all of the research so far we have been selecting the topics with special significance, and in the first quarter of 2017, we kept track of writings relating to the upcoming presidential elections (topic: *political scene in Serbia*, element: *presidential elections*) which marked this trimester. Articles covering local crime news, having social and political significance, as well as the writings relating to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, were again included into the sample, as an example of the paradigm of the state of Serbian journalism, which is marked by various kinds of disrespect for the ethical principles of reporting.

**Topic Prominence**

In the period of January – March 2017, political topics once again took up the larger part of front page space of the daily newspapers in the sample. Apart from the *political scene in Serbia*, present in as much as 778 or 32.38% of all articles, which is about 10% more than in previous quarter. Remaining political topics *activities of the Government of Serbia*, *activities of the Prime Minister* and *activities of the President of Serbia* are present in 51 texts (2.12%), so in total politics encompass one third of the sample in the first quarter. This time, regional topics are marked by events regarding Kosovo and relations of Belgrade and Priština, which makes it a second topic. The number of Kosovo related topics is 2.5 times greater in comparison with the previous quarter (175 texts – 7.28% in the first quarter of 2017, compared to 65 – 2.89% in the last quarter of 2016). *The economy* has a presence of 163 front page articles (6.78%), while the events related to the region are more prominent than in the previous quarter – 6.33% or 152 texts. However, the character of those articles remains the same – predominantly negative (58.55% of articles have a negative connotation). The arrests and criminal persecution of criminal elements and similar topics once again take up significant space on the front pages (95 texts), while the activities of judiciary institutions are on decline – about 1.5% less have been published in comparison to previous quarter, i.e. 73 or 3.04%. Among the topics considering international relations, the interest of media is this time directed towards USA (74 texts – 3.08%). Ten most prominent topics are enclosed by economy (62 texts), army (60) and international relations (45). In comparison with the majority of previous quarters, topics regarding relations with Russia (42 texts or 1.75%) and EU (41 – 1.71%) are not in the top 10 topics in this quarter.

If we look at the value contexts in the 2403 selected articles in the first quarter of 2017, 33.96% of writings were given value connotations – 28.84% negative and 5.12% positive. Of all the mentioned topics, the highest number of negative articles was written about regional relations – 58.55%, and the relations between Belgrade and Priština – 58.86%. A third of negative articles is dedicated to criminal (34.74%), activities of judiciary (35.62%) and international relations (31.11%), while concerning the topic of *industry*, 29.45% of the articles had a value context. Industry and army are the only topics that have a significant number of positive texts – 19 (11.66%) and 14 (23.33%).

All media	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	778	32.38	1	0.13	620	79.69	157	20.18
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	175	7.28	0	0.00	72	41.14	103	58.86
industry	163	6.78	19	11.66	96	58.90	48	29.45
regional cooperation/regional relations	152	6.33	3	1.97	60	39.47	89	58.55
criminal	95	3.95	0	0.00	62	65.26	33	34.74
USA/attitude towards USA	74	3.08	1	1.35	55	74.32	18	24.32
judiciary topics	73	3.04	0	0.00	47	64.38	26	35.62
economics	62	2.58	3	4.84	48	77.42	11	17.74
army	60	2.50	14	23.33	39	65.00	7	11.67
international relations	45	1.87	0	0.00	31	68.89	14	31.11

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Value context in relation to all the topics and all the seven sampled media

Total	number	%
positive	123	5.12
neutral	1587	66.04
negative	693	28.84
total	2403	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

As it was already pointed out, in the first quarter of 2017 we paid special attention to the topic *political scene in Serbia* in our analysis, if the element *presidential elections* was present. A total of 569 articles were published that spoke about the presidential elections, i.e. 73.14% of the articles with a political context contained this element. Most of these texts were found in *Danas* 118 (20.74%), followed by *Blic* (113 – 19.86%), *Večernje novosti* (98 – 17.22%), *Kurir* 77 – (13.53), *Alo!* (67 – 11.78%) and *Informer* (63 – ili 11.07%). In comparison to other media, *Politika* dedicated the least amount of space to this topic with 33 or 5.8% of written articles. The character of these articles shows a dramatic departure only in *Informer*, where 71.43% of writings has a negative connotation, while the rest of the media wrote about this topic from a neutral standpoint in more than 80% of writings. There was only one text with positive connotations present on the front pages, in *Danas*.

The prominence and value context for the topic *political scene in Serbia*, if the element *presidential elections* is present, for the seven sampled media – I quarter of 2017

Political scene in Serbia/presidential elections	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Danas</i>	118	20.74	1	0.85	104	88.14	13	11.02
<i>Blic</i>	113	19.86	0	0.00	106	93.81	7	6.19
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	98	17.22	0	0.00	97	98.98	1	1.02
<i>Kurir</i>	77	13.53	0	0.00	65	84.42	12	15.58
<i>Alo!</i>	67	11.78	0	0.00	64	95.52	3	4.48
<i>Informer</i>	63	11.07	0	0.00	18	28.57	45	71.43
<i>Politika</i>	33	5.80	0	0.00	30	90.91	3	9.09
total	569	100.00	1	0.18	484	85.06	84	14.76

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017


The prominence and value context for the topic *political scene in Serbia*, if the element *presidential elections* is present, for the seven sampled media – IV quarter of 2016

Political scene in Serbia/presidential elections	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Danas</i>	36	17.65	0	0.00	35	97.22	1	2.78
<i>Kurir</i>	36	17.65	0	0.00	29	80.56	7	19.44
<i>Informer</i>	31	15.20	0	0.00	5	16.13	26	83.87
<i>Blic</i>	31	15.20	0	0.00	30	96.77	1	3.23
<i>Alo!</i>	29	14.22	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	23	11.27	0	0.00	22	95.65	1	4.35
<i>Politika</i>	18	8.82	0	0.00	14	77.78	4	22.22

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

If we take a look at the attitude of the media towards the foreign policy of Serbia, and especially in relation to Russia and the European Union, we'll see that the topics about this two actors are equally represented. However, the manner in which the media treats these topics is completely different. Regarding Russia, 47.62% of all texts are positive, which is the result of activities of newspaper *Informer*, where 14 out of 18 published articles are positive (77.78%). Positive texts on Russia are also recorded in *Politika* (3), *Večernje novosti* (2) and *Kurir* (1), while those with negative tone could be found only in *Blic* (2) and *Danas* (1). On the other hand, EU had only two positive texts in *Politika*, but also 4 negative ones, as well as in *Informer* (2) and *Kurir* (1).

**Graph** – Value context in all of the sampled media in relation to the topics of *Russia/attitude towards Russia and the EU/the politics of the European Union*



Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Distribution according to the media**

**Blic**

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	139	40.76	0	0.00	124	89.21	15	10.79
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	32	9.38	0	0.00	19	59.38	13	40.63
industry	29	8.50	0	0.00	18	62.07	11	37.93
criminal	17	4.99	0	0.00	12	70.59	5	29.41
judiciary topics	16	4.69	0	0.00	8	50.00	8	50.00
regional cooperation/regional relations	14	4.11	0	0.00	8	57.14	6	42.86
army	9	2.64	1	11.11	8	88.89	0	0.00
USA/attitude towards USA	8	2.35	0	0.00	5	62.50	3	37.50
economics	8	2.35	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Russia / relation towards Russia	7	2.05	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Blic*

<i>Blic</i>	number	%
positive	3	0.88
neutral	250	73.31
negative	88	25.81
total	341	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Kurir**

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	118	46.27	0	0.00	83	70.34	35	29.66
murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović	19	7.45	0	0.00	9	47.37	10	52.63
criminal	19	7.45	0	0.00	10	52.63	9	47.37
Hague /war crimes	16	6.27	1	6.25	6	37.50	9	56.25
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	16	6.27	0	0.00	0	0.00	16	100.00
regional cooperation/regional relations	8	3.14	2	25.00	2	25.00	4	50.00
USA/attitude towards USA	7	2.75	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
entertainment/show business	7	2.75	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
activities of the prime minister	6	2.35	1	16.67	5	83.33	0	0.00
army	5	1.96	1	20.00	3	60.00	1	20.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Table 37.** – Vrednosni kontekst u odnosu na sve teme u listu *Kurir*

<i>Kurir</i>	number	%
positive	8	3.14
neutral	149	58.43
negative	98	38.43
total	255	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	82	36.28	0	0.00	23	28.05	59	71.95
regional cooperation/regional relations	19	8.41	0	0.00	3	15.79	16	84.21
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	18	7.96	0	0.00	4	22.22	14	77.78
Russia / relation towards Russia	18	7.96	14	77.78	4	22.22	0	0.00
USA/attitude towards USA	13	5.75	0	0.00	5	38.46	8	61.54
industry	11	4.87	1	9.09	9	81.82	1	9.09
NATO / NATO integrations	9	3.98	0	0.00	1	11.11	8	88.89
criminal	8	3.54	0	0.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
international relations	6	2.65	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
army	6	2.65	3	50.00	3	50.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Informer*

<i>Informer</i>	number	%
positive	27	11.95
neutral	73	32.30
negative	126	55.75
total	226	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

*Alo!*

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	105	45.06	0	0.00	93	88.57	12	11.43
criminal	27	11.59	0	0.00	22	81.48	5	18.52
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	19	8.15	0	0.00	7	36.84	12	63.16
regional cooperation/regional relations	16	6.87	0	0.00	4	25.00	12	75.00
army	7	3.00	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
USA/attitude towards USA	7	3.00	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
industry	6	2.58	0	0.00	2	33.33	4	66.67
economics	4	1.72	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
social issues/social policies	4	1.72	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
judiciary topics	3	1.29	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Alo!*

<i>Alo!</i>	number	%
positive	2	0.86
neutral	171	73.39
negative	60	25.75
total	233	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Politika**

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
industry	55	11.46	7	12.73	33	60.00	15	27.27
political scene in Serbia	48	10.00	0	0.00	37	77.08	11	22.92
regional cooperation/regional relations	41	8.54	1	2.44	16	39.02	24	58.54
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	38	7.92	0	0.00	22	57.89	16	42.11
judiciary topics	26	5.42	0	0.00	16	61.54	10	38.46
USA/attitude towards USA	25	5.21	0	0.00	21	84.00	4	16.00
health services	23	4.79	11	47.83	8	34.78	4	17.39
EU/ politics of the European Union	23	4.79	2	8.70	17	73.91	4	17.39
international relations	20	4.17	0	0.00	16	80.00	4	20.00
education	17	3.54	2	11.76	12	70.59	3	17.65

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Politika*

<i>Politika</i>	number	%
positive	39	8.13
neutral	310	64.58
negative	131	27.29
total	480	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Večernje novosti**

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	102	23.67	0	0.00	101	99.02	1	0.98
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	39	9.05	0	0.00	8	20.51	31	79.49
regional cooperation/regional relations	37	8.58	0	0.00	10	27.03	27	72.97
industry	29	6.73	11	37.93	14	48.28	4	13.79
criminal	16	3.71	0	0.00	6	37.50	10	62.50
economics	13	3.02	1	7.69	12	92.31	0	0.00
social issues/social policies	13	3.02	2	15.38	10	76.92	1	7.69
health services	12	2.78	3	25.00	8	66.67	1	8.33
army	11	2.55	5	45.45	3	27.27	3	27.27
judiciary topics	11	2.55	0	0.00	7	63.64	4	36.36

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Večernje novosti*

<i>Večernje novosti</i>	number	%
positive	41	9.51
neutral	277	64.27
negative	113	26.22
total	431	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Danas**

Distribution of topics and their value context in the newspaper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	Value context in relation to topic							
	total		positive		neutral		negative	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
political scene in Serbia	184	42.11	1	0.54	159	86.41	24	13.04
industry	31	7.09	0	0.00	19	61.29	12	38.71
economics	22	5.03	0	0.00	18	81.82	4	18.18
culture	21	4.81	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
regional cooperation/regional relations	17	3.89	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo/relations between Belgrade and Priština	13	2.97	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
judiciary topics	12	2.75	0	0.00	9	75.00	3	25.00
media/freedom of the media	12	2.75	0	0.00	8	66.67	4	33.33
EU/ politics of the European Union	10	2.29	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
USA/attitude towards USA	10	2.29	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Value context in relation to all of the topics in the newspaper *Danas*

<i>Danas</i>	number	%
positive	3	0.69
neutral	357	81.69
negative	77	17.62
total	437	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Balance**

When we take into consideration all of the sampled articles for the period of January – March 2017, it is noticeable that most of the prominent topics were not comprehensively analyzed, evidenced by the fact that balance is present in only 21.43% of total writings, being almost identical to the results from the previous quarter (20.97%). The articles with the least amount of balance have been found in the newspaper *Kurir*, 2.75%, with a similar result found in *Informer*, 3.54%. The newspaper *Alo!* has greater percentage of balanced texts (19.31%), and it's followed by *Blic* (27.57%), *Danas* (32.51%) and *Politika* (23.96%), while the largest number of balanced articles has been found in *Večernje novosti* (33.64%), which is still a very small percentage of unbiased articles.

Even though the value context is not present in 66.04% of the total articles, when making an overview of the actual state of the sampled media, we should certainly consider the fact that the majority of the front page articles that were analyzed are not objective, and that such a one-sided approach paints a clear picture of the general state of the media in Serbia.

Balanced texts, ultimately, necessarily demonstrate a certain degree of restraint, which, obviously, is not a notion widely spread in Serbian journalism. Taking sides, which can be quite passionate, attracts readership, but reduces relevance. The emphasis is on reacting quickly, quite the opposite of the detailed and rational presentation of information which demands research, a great number of interviewees and reliable and traceable data, with accessible information sources. This tendency quickly increases circulation and popularity, but it does not increase respectability. Balance in relation to all of the topics and all the seven sampled media

Balance in relation to all of the topics and all the seven sampled media

Balance	yes		no	
	number	%	number	%
<i>Kurir</i>	7	2.75	248	97.25
<i>Informer</i>	8	3.54	218	96.46
<i>Alo!</i>	45	19.31	188	80.69
<i>Blic</i>	94	27.57	247	72.43
<i>Danas</i>	101	23.11	336	76.89
<i>Politics</i>	115	23.96	365	76.04
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	145	33.64	286	66.36
total	515	21.43	1888	78.57

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Actors**

Serbian media, at least according to the analysis of the empirical material collected from the front pages, primarily focus on the political events in Serbia. As much as 49.08% of the total number of actors mentioned in the sampled texts from the front pages consists of (individual and collective) political actors keeping various political functions in the Serbian political scene. If we add articles that write about foreign political actors to this number, the percentage of the presence of political actors on the front pages rises to 73.83%. The second group according to the frequency of appearance are various social actors that make up 14.76% of our sample. Industry and economic actors appear as front page protagonists only in 7.40% (see the following table).

The total distribution of actors that appear in the texts sampled for the research (expressed in absolute numbers)

Actors					
Political actors	10559	Domestic	7019	Individual	5327
				Collective	1692
		Foreign	3540	Individual	2581
				Collective	959
Industry/economical actors	1059	Domestic	1008	Individual	399
				Collective	609
		Foreign	51	Individual	27
				Collective	24
Other social actors	2111	Domestic	2057	Individual	1693
				Collective	364
		Foreign	54	Individual	49
				Collective	5
Unnamed source					571
<b>Total</b>					<b>14300</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

**Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors from the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the President of the Republic of Serbia**

The Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Aleksandar Vučić	835	40.73	40	4.79	761	91.14	34	4.07
Tomislav Nikolić	355	17.32	0	0.00	314	88.45	41	11.55
Ivica Dačić	235	11.46	1	0.43	224	95.32	10	4.26
Nebojša Stefanović	106	5.17	2	1.89	101	95.28	3	2.83
Zorana Mihajlović	96	4.68	2	2.08	87	90.63	7	7.29
Aleksandar Vulin	83	4.05	0	0.00	76	91.57	7	8.43
Rasim Ljajić	59	2.88	0	0.00	56	94.92	3	5.08
Zoran Đorđević	50	2.44	0	0.00	50	100.00	0	0.00
Zlatibor Lončar	36	1.76	0	0.00	36	100.00	0	0.00
Mladen Šarčević	30	1.46	0	0.00	29	96.67	1	3.33
Ana Brnabić	25	1.22	1	4.00	23	92.00	1	4.00
Nela Kuburović	24	1.17	0	0.00	22	91.67	2	8.33
Slavica Đukić Dejanović	22	1.07	1	4.55	21	95.45	0	0.00
Dušan Vujović	20	0.98	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Knežević	17	0.83	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Aleksandar Antić	13	0.63	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Jadranka Joksimović	11	0.54	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Vladan Vukosavljević	10	0.49	0	0.00	9	90.00	1	10.00
Branislav Nedimović	9	0.44	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Krkobabić	7	0.34	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Vanja Udovičić	7	0.34	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
<b>total</b>	<b>2050</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>2.29</b>	<b>1887</b>	<b>92.05</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>5.66</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Same as in the previous quarter, the most prominent actor on the front pages of the daily newspapers in Serbia was the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, towards whom the media from our sample was mostly neutral (in 91.14% of cases). He also appears in 4.79% (40) positive and 4.07% (34) negative articles. The Prime Minister appears as the protagonist of 835 front page articles, which is considerably more than the second-ranked actor, the President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić, who appears in a total of 355 articles, and the third-ranked actor, the Foreign Affairs Minister Ivica Dačić, is present in only 235 articles. The highest frequency of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić, expressed in absolute numbers, is evidenced in the newspapers *Danas* (201), *Blic* (143) and *Večernje novosti* (105). Expressed in relative numbers of the percentage share of articles in which he appears as an actor, with relation to the total number of selected articles from the same individual newspaper, we can see that he is the most prominent actor in *Danas* (46%), followed by *Blic* (41.94%) and *Kurir* (41.18%). The smallest share of articles which have the Prime Minister of the Serbian Government as an actor is found in the newspaper *Politika* (21.67%).

When we are talking about the value context, the biggest share, as well as the number of negative articles, is again evidenced in *Danas* (12.44% or 25 texts). Apart from this newspaper, articles with a negative connotation have been also found in *Blic* (6.29% or 9 texts). The largest number of articles with positive connotations was published in the newspaper *Informer* – 16.42% or 11 texts, followed by *Alo!* (8), *Kurir* (7), *Večernje novosti* (7), *Politika* (5) and *Blic* (2).

Aleksandar Vučić: Value context in relation to the media

Aleksandar Vučić media	positive		neutral		negative		total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Alo!</i>	8	10.13	71	89.87	0	0.00	79	9.46
<i>Blic</i>	2	1.40	132	92.31	9	6.29	143	17.13
<i>Danas</i>	0	0.00	176	87.56	25	12.44	201	24.07
<i>Informer</i>	11	16.42	56	83.58	0	0.00	67	8.02
<i>Kurir</i>	7	6.67	98	93.33	0	0.00	105	12.57
<i>Politika</i>	5	4.81	99	95.19	0	0.00	104	12.46
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	7	5.15	129	94.85	0	0.00	136	16.29
total	40	4.79	761	91.14	34	4.07	835	100.00

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Number of appearances of Aleksandar Vučić in relation to the total number of articles in individual daily newspapers

Aleksandar Vučić according to the media	number of appearances	Total number of texts	% share in relation to the total number of texts
<i>Danas</i>	201	437	46.00
<i>Blic</i>	143	341	41.94
<i>Kurir</i>	105	255	41.18
<i>Alo!</i>	79	233	33.91
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	136	431	31.55
<i>Informer</i>	67	226	29.65
<i>Politika</i>	104	480	21.67
total	835	2403	34.75

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

The President of the Republic of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić, protagonist of 355 (17.32%) analyzed articles, is in the second place according to the frequency of appearance of the individual political actors on the Serbian political scene.

The largest number of articles in which the President of Serbia appears as an actor have been published in the newspapers *Danas* (77), *Večernje novosti* (58) and *Kurir* (57), but the biggest share in relation to the total number of articles in the individual media is in *Kurir* – 22.35%. The largest number of articles with a negative connotation towards Tomislav Nikolić has been found in the newspaper *Blic* and *Alo!* (12 texts each), followed by *Danas* (8) and *Informer* (7). In this quarter, same as in the previous one, there was not a single published positive text on the current President of Serbia.

The remaining actors from this group are in almost 95% of the texts represented in a neutral value context. Apart from the President and the Prime Minister, a little bit higher number of texts with a negative connotation concerns Ivica Dačić – 10<sup>1</sup> and Aleksandar Vulin and Zorana Mihajlović (7 texts with a negative connotation each).

<sup>1</sup> Compared to 15 text with a negative connotation in the previous quarter, 21 in the third calendar quarter of 2016, and 35 texts with a negative connotation in the second calendar quarter.



Number of appearances of Tomislav Nikolić in relation to the total number of articles in individual daily newspapers

Tomislav Nikolić according to the media	number of appearances	Total number of texts	% share in relation to the total number of texts
<i>Kurir</i>	57	255	22.35
<i>Alo!</i>	44	233	18.88
<i>Danas</i>	77	437	17.62
<i>Blic</i>	53	341	15.54
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	58	431	13.46
<i>Politika</i>	45	480	9.38
<i>Informer</i>	21	226	9.29
total	355	2403	14.77

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Tomislav Nikolić: Value context in relation to the media

Tomislav Nikolić media	positive		neutral		negative		total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
<i>Alo!</i>	0	0	32	72.73	12	27.27	44	12.39
<i>Blic</i>	0	0	41	77.36	12	22.64	53	14.93
<i>Danas</i>	0	0	69	89.61	8	10.39	77	21.69
<i>Informer</i>	0	0	14	66.67	7	33.33	21	5.92
<i>Kurir</i>	0	0	57	100	0	0	57	16.06
<i>Politika</i>	0	0	43	95.56	2	4.44	45	12.68
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	0	0	58	100	0	0	58	16.34
total	0	0	314	88.45	41	11.55	355	100

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

After the announcement of the presidential elections, already in the fourth quarter of 2016, we could see a growth in the number of opposition actors. Compared to the last quarter of 2015, the number of appearances from opposition actors doubled in the first and second quarter of 2016 (1428 and 1552 in the first and the second quarter of 2016, compared to 762 in the last quarter of 2015). In the third quarter of 2016, we recorded 792 appearances, which is common for the representation of these actors in the headlines. In the fourth quarter, we marked 1225 appearances of the opposition actors. In the first quarter of 2017, there were already 1981 appearances of actors from the opposition. The most common opposition leader was Vuk Jeremić (323 characters), Saša Janković (316) and Vojislav Šešelj (203). Most negative articles were written about Vuk Jeremić (63 - 19.50%) and Saša Janković (46 - 14.56%). The highest percentage of negatively connoted texts were recorded in the case of Sulejman Ugljanin, of whom as much as 75% texts were written in negative context (12 out of 16 written altogether, were negative). In the first quarter of 2017, 11 positively connoted texts (0.56%) were written about the representatives of the opposition.

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors from the **opposition**

Opposition – individually	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vuk Jeremić	323	16.30	0	0.00	260	80.50	63	19.50
Saša Janković	316	15.95	2	0.63	268	84.81	46	14.56
Vojislav Šešelj	203	10.25	2	0.99	191	94.09	10	4.93
Boris Tadić	108	5.45	0	0.00	102	94.44	6	5.56
Saša Radulović	103	5.20	0	0.00	95	92.23	8	7.77
Boško Obradović	99	5.00	0	0.00	89	89.90	10	10.10
Ljubiša Preletačević Beli	85	4.29	3	3.53	81	95.29	1	1.18
Nenad Čanak	62	3.13	0	0.00	56	90.32	6	9.68
Čedomir Jovanović	58	2.93	0	0.00	53	91.38	5	8.62
Dragan Šutanovac	55	2.78	0	0.00	52	94.55	3	5.45
Velimir Ilić	54	2.73	0	0.00	41	75.93	13	24.07
Miroslav Parović	36	1.82	0	0.00	35	97.22	1	2.78
Milan Stamatović	35	1.77	0	0.00	33	94.29	2	5.71
Aleksandar Popović	32	1.62	1	3.13	31	96.88	0	0.00
Sanda Rašković Ivić	26	1.31	0	0.00	25	96.15	1	3.85
Zoran Živković	21	1.06	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
Dijana Vukomanović	19	0.96	0	0.00	18	94.74	1	5.26
Dušan Petrović	17	0.86	0	0.00	13	76.47	4	23.53
Sulejman Ugljanin	16	0.81	0	0.00	4	25.00	12	75.00
Đorđe Vukadinović	15	0.76	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
Dušan Duda Ivković	15	0.76	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Miroslava Milenović	14	0.71	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Marinika Tepić	13	0.66	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Borko Stefanović	13	0.66	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić	9	0.45	1	11.11	8	88.89	0	0.00
Dušan Teodorović	9	0.45	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Vjerica Radeta	8	0.40	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Đurišić	8	0.40	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Radoslav Milojević Kena	8	0.40	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Danijela Sremac	7	0.35	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00

Branimir Kuzmanović	7	0.35	0	0.00	3	42.86	4	57.14
Bojan Pajtić	7	0.35	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Nemanja Šarović	7	0.35	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Balša Božović	6	0.30	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Konstantin Samofalov	6	0.30	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Branislav Lečić	6	0.30	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Korać	5	0.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dragoljub Mićunović	5	0.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Janko Veselinović	5	0.25	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Miloš Jovanović	5	0.25	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jovan Ratković	3	0.15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Vučetić	3	0.15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Popović	3	0.15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Gordana Čomić	3	0.15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Željka Radeta	3	0.15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Salak	3	0.15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Milić	3	0.15	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	114	5.75	2	1.75	103	90.35	9	7.89
<b>total</b>	<b>1981</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>1759</b>	<b>88.79</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>10.65</b>

Izvor: Istraživanje *Mediaametar*, januar – mart 2017.

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors from the **ruling coalition**

The ruling coalition – individually	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dragan Marković Palma	39	8.25	0	0.00	35	89.74	4	10.26
Radomir Nikolić	35	7.40	0	0.00	35	100.00	0	0.00
Bogoljub Karić	32	6.77	0	0.00	29	90.63	3	9.38
Branko Ružić	28	5.92	1	3.57	27	96.43	0	0.00
Nikola Selaković	27	5.71	1	3.70	25	92.59	1	3.70
Milutin Mrkonjić	26	5.50	0	0.00	21	80.77	5	19.23
Milenko Jovanov	25	5.29	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Đukanović	24	5.07	0	0.00	24	100.00	0	0.00
Milovan Drecun	20	4.23	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Dubravka Filipovski	19	4.02	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Popović	13	2.75	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Martinić	13	2.75	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Muamer Zukorlić	11	2.33	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Novica Tončev	8	1.69	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Žarko Obradović	8	1.69	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Vuk Drašković	8	1.69	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Marijan Ristićević	8	1.69	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Miroslav Lazanski	8	1.69	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Bratislav Gašić	7	1.48	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Dragan Jovanović	7	1.48	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Darko Glišić	6	1.27	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miroslav Markićević	6	1.27	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Obradović	5	1.06	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Babić	5	1.06	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Milićević	5	1.06	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ištvan Pastor	4	0.85	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Bratislav Jugović	4	0.85	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Đorđe Čabarkapa	4	0.85	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Veroljub Arsić	4	0.85	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Božović	3	0.63	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivana Petrović	3	0.63	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Igor Bečić	3	0.63	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miodrag Linta	3	0.63	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ivica Tončev	3	0.63	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	49	10.36	0	0.00	46	93.88	3	6.12
<b>total</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>451</b>	<b>95.35</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4.23</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual political actors representing **state authorities, institutions and agencies**

State authorities, institutions and agencies – individually	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Marko Đurić	57	14.32	0	0.00	53	92.98	4	7.02
Maja Gojković	50	12.56	0	0.00	48	96.00	2	4.00
Siniša Mali	49	12.31	0	0.00	42	85.71	7	14.29
Stanislava Pak	23	5.78	0	0.00	21	91.30	2	8.70
Jorgovanka Tabaković	17	4.27	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Miloš Vučević	15	3.77	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Vesić	12	3.02	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Miša Vacić	7	1.76	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Milovan Drecun	6	1.51	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Jablanović	5	1.26	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Ana Hrustanović	4	1.01	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vesna Nedeljković	4	1.01	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Dimitrijević	4	1.01	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Božović	4	1.01	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Đerđ Matković	4	1.01	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Oliver Antić	4	1.01	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Zoran Stanković	4	1.01	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Cucić	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Mikić	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Verica Lazić	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Darko Bulatović	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Meho Mahmutović	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tanja Mišćević	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Kozarev	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Veljko Odalović	3	0.75	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Rade Bulatović	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Biljana Popović Ivković	3	0.75	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	99	24.87	0	0.00	82	82.83	17	17.17
<b>total</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>357</b>	<b>89.70</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>10.30</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of **other** individual and collective political and social actors

Other actors	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Slobodan Milošević	94	17.34	1	1.06	86	91.49	7	7.45
Zoran Đinđić	53	9.78	1	1.89	52	98.11	0	0.00
Vojislav Koštunica	31	5.72	0	0.00	31	100.00	0	0.00
Emir Kusturica	25	4.61	2	8.00	23	92.00	0	0.00
Mlađan Dinkić	21	3.87	0	0.00	14	66.67	7	33.33
Nataša Jeremić	21	3.87	0	0.00	15	71.43	6	28.57
Andrej Vučić	17	3.14	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
Marija Mali	16	2.95	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Dragica Nikolić	15	2.77	0	0.00	13	86.67	2	13.33
SANU	14	2.58	2	14.29	12	85.71	0	0.00
Vlado Georgijev	14	2.58	1	7.14	11	78.57	2	14.29
Mirjana Marković	14	2.58	0	0.00	14	100.00	0	0.00
Mirko Cvetković	12	2.21	0	0.00	11	91.67	1	8.33
Svetlana Ceca Ražnatović	11	2.03	1	9.09	10	90.91	0	0.00
CIRSD	11	2.03	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Ana Bekuta	8	1.48	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Vesna Pešić	7	1.29	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Nataša Kandić	7	1.29	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Youth initiative for human rights	7	1.29	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57

Vladimir Beba Popović	7	1.29	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Slobodan Vuksanović	7	1.29	1	14.29	6	85.71	0	0.00
Slavko Ćuruvija	6	1.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Kostić	6	1.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Aleksandar Karađorđević	6	1.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Miroljub Labus	6	1.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Matija Bečković	6	1.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Kovačević	5	0.92	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Biljana Srbljanović	5	0.92	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Verbić	5	0.92	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Fond for humanitarian right	5	0.92	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Mile Novaković	5	0.92	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ivan Tasovac	5	0.92	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Dušan Mihajlović	5	0.92	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Jelena Milić	5	0.92	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Dragan Đilas	5	0.92	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Branko Krga	4	0.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Filip David	4	0.74	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Serbianka Turajlić	4	0.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Predrag Gojković	4	0.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Jurić	4	0.74	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Marko Jablanović	4	0.74	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Zoran Čičak	4	0.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Belgrade center for security policy	4	0.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Veruović	4	0.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Milošević	4	0.74	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aca Tomić	3	0.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Jakovljević	3	0.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dražen Milovanović	3	0.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Božidar Đelić	3	0.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nada Macura	3	0.55	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
<b>total</b>	<b>542</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1.85</b>	<b>492</b>	<b>90.77</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>7.38</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of domestic collective political actors: **state authorities and institutions**

State authorities, institutions and agencies – collectively	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
The Government of Serbia	163	23.12	3	1.84	155	95.09	5	3.07
The Ministry of Internal Affairs	62	8.79	0	0.00	62	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Defense	38	5.39	0	0.00	37	97.37	1	2.63
“Serbian authorities”	36	5.11	1	2.78	35	97.22	0	0.00
The Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development	35	4.96	0	0.00	33	94.29	2	5.71
The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia	27	3.83	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Health	27	3.83	1	3.70	24	88.89	2	7.41
RIK	25	3.55	1	4.00	23	92.00	1	4.00
The Ministry of Justice	25	3.55	0	0.00	25	100.00	0	0.00
The National Bank of Serbia	24	3.40	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
The Ministry of Industry	21	2.98	0	0.00	21	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Policy	20	2.84	0	0.00	18	90.00	2	10.00
The Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure	15	2.13	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection	14	1.99	1	7.14	13	92.86	0	0.00
The Ministry of Finance	13	1.84	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Tax Administration of Serbia	13	1.84	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	13	1.84	0	0.00	11	84.62	2	15.38

The Ministry of Public Administration and Local Self-Government	10	1.42	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Culture and the Media	8	1.13	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
The Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Telecommunications	8	1.13	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
The Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Serbia	8	1.13	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Office for Kosovo and Metohija, the Government of the Republic of Serbia	8	1.13	0	0.00	6	75.00	2	25.00
The National Employment Agency	7	0.99	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
National security council	7	0.99	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Privatization Agency	7	0.99	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
The National Health Insurance Fund	6	0.85	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
RFZO	6	0.85	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
The ministry of Mining and Energy	5	0.71	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Youth and sport	5	0.71	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
The city of Belgrade	5	0.71	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
The Presidency of the Republic of Serbia	5	0.71	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Republic Fund PIO	4	0.57	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Republic Agency for Property	3	0.43	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Republic Geodetic Institute	3	0.43	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	29	4.11	0	0.00	28	96.55	1	3.45
<b>total</b>	<b>705</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>671</b>	<b>95.18</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>3.83</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of domestic collective political actors: **the ruling coalition**

The ruling coalition – collectively	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
SNS	279	64.14	1	0.36	257	92.11	21	7.53
SPS	99	22.76	0	0.00	95	95.96	4	4.04
SDPS	11	2.53	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
PUPS	9	2.07	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Jedinstvena Serbia	9	2.07	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Pokret snaga Srbije	6	1.38	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Pokret socijalista	6	1.38	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
SPO	5	1.15	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
SNP	5	1.15	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
SVM	3	0.69	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	3	0.69	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>435</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>408</b>	<b>93.79</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5.98</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of domestic collective political actors: **opposition**

Opposition – collectively	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
DS	115	28.61	0	0.00	105	91.30	10	8.70
Dosta je bilo	64	15.92	0	0.00	63	98.44	1	1.56
SRS	37	9.20	0	0.00	34	91.89	3	8.11
Dveri	35	8.71	0	0.00	34	97.14	1	2.86
LDP	28	6.97	0	0.00	28	100.00	0	0.00
DSS	27	6.72	0	0.00	26	96.30	1	3.70
Nova Srbija	24	5.97	0	0.00	23	95.83	1	4.17
SDS	22	5.47	0	0.00	22	100.00	0	0.00
LSV	19	4.73	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Nova stranka	10	2.49	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
SDA Sandžaka	7	1.74	0	0.00	5	71.43	2	28.57
Levica Srbije	4	1.00	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
others	10	2.49	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>383</b>	<b>95.27</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>4.73</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective actors:

**Kosovo**

Kosovo	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hashim Thaçi	128	20.06	0	0.00	69	53.91	59	46.09
Ramush Haradinaj	71	11.13	0	0.00	33	46.48	38	53.52
Isa Mustafa	53	8.31	0	0.00	40	75.47	13	24.53
“Kosovo authorities”	45	7.05	0	0.00	18	40.00	27	60.00
ROSU	32	5.02	0	0.00	23	71.88	9	28.13
OVK	27	4.23	0	0.00	7	25.93	20	74.07
Kadri Veseli	23	3.61	0	0.00	15	65.22	8	34.78
Oliver Ivanović	18	2.82	2	11.11	16	88.89	0	0.00
KFOR	18	2.82	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Goran Rakić	15	2.35	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo police	11	1.72	0	0.00	9	81.82	2	18.18
Kosovo’s Court of Appellation	10	1.57	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Euleks	10	1.57	0	0.00	6	60.00	4	40.00
Branimir Stojanović	8	1.25	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Kosovo security forces	8	1.25	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Edita Tahiri	7	1.10	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Behgjet Pacolli	7	1.10	0	0.00	0	0.00	7	100.00
BSK	7	1.10	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Enver Hoxhaj	6	0.94	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Serbian list	5	0.78	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Slavko Simić	5	0.78	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Fatmir Limaj	5	0.78	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Dalibor Jeftić	4	0.63	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Rahman Rama	4	0.63	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kosovo)	4	0.63	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
The Government of Kosovo	3	0.47	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Azem Vlasi	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Ferhat Šalja	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milena Popović Ivanović	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Trepča	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Adem Jašari	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Petrit Selljimi	3	0.47	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Alliance for the future of Kosovo	3	0.47	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Self-determination movement	2	0.31	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
others	81	12.70	0	0.00	64	79.01	17	20.99

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Croatia**

Croatia	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović	20	19.05	0	0.00	11	55.00	9	45.00
Andrej Plenković	9	8.57	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Franjo Tuđman	6	5.71	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Ante Gotovina	5	4.76	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Stjepan Mesić	4	3.81	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Milorad Pupovac	4	3.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Croatian authorities	3	2.86	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	100.00
Zoran Milanović	3	2.86	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
HDZ	3	2.86	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Miro Barešić	3	2.86	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
others	45	42.86	0	0.00	36	80.00	9	20.00
<b>total</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>71.43</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>28.57</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Montenegro**

Montenegro	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milo Đukanović	17	18.28	0	0.00	15	88.24	2	11.76
Andrija Mandić	6	6.45	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
DPS	5	5.38	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Duško Marković	5	5.38	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Demokratski front	4	4.30	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Special state prosecution of Montenegro	3	3.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milivoje Katnić	3	3.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Knežević	3	3.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Filip Vujanović	3	3.23	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	44	47.31	0	0.00	23	52.27	21	47.73
<b>total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>75.27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24.73</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors from the region: **Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Bosnia and Herzegovina	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Milorad Dodik	75	18.89	1	1.33	72	96.00	2	2.67
Bakir Izetbegović	62	15.62	0	0.00	47	75.81	15	24.19
Mladen Ivanić	39	9.82	0	0.00	39	100.00	0	0.00
Sakib Softić	19	4.79	0	0.00	16	84.21	3	15.79
Valentin Incko	11	2.77	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Alija Izetbegović	11	2.77	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Igor Crnadak	9	2.27	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Denis Zvizdić	9	2.27	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Čavić	8	2.02	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina	8	2.02	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Mektić	7	1.76	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
SDS	6	1.51	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
SDA	6	1.51	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina	6	1.51	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Čović	5	1.26	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	1.26	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Branislav Borenović	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
SNSD	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mirsada Čolaković	3	0.76	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Biljana Plavšić	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vukota Govedarica	3	0.76	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	0.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	0.50	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
others	92	23.17	0	0.00	82	89.13	10	10.87
<b>total</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>363</b>	<b>91.44</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>8.31</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017



Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **foreign politicians**

Foreign political actors	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Edi Rama	27	6.03	0	0.00	16	59.26	11	40.74
Zoran Zaev	22	4.91	1	4.55	14	63.64	7	31.82
ISIL	20	4.46	0	0.00	13	65.00	7	35.00
Xi Jinping	19	4.24	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Đorđe Ivanov	16	3.57	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Nikola Gruevski	15	3.35	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	13	2.90	0	0.00	12	92.31	1	7.69
Theresa May	10	2.23	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Viktor Orban	10	2.23	0	0.00	7	70.00	3	30.00
Alexis Tsipras	10	2.23	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Francois Hollande	9	2.01	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Alexander Lukashenko	9	2.01	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Tony Blair	8	1.79	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Lee Machang	8	1.79	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
“French authorities”	7	1.56	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Bujar Nishani	6	1.34	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Marine Le Pen	6	1.34	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Sebastijan Kurz	5	1.12	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
“Chinese authorities”	5	1.12	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
SDSM	5	1.12	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
VMRO-DPMNE	4	0.89	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Ali Ahmeti	3	0.67	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Nigel Farage	3	0.67	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
DUI	3	0.67	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Madeleine Albright	3	0.67	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Klaus Johannis	3	0.67	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bashar al-Assad	3	0.67	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Petro Poroshenko	3	0.67	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	3	0.67	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	190	42.41	1	0.53	179	94.21	10	5.26
total	448	100.00	2	0.45	399	89.06	47	10.49

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **Germany**

Germany	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Angela Merkel	61	52.14	0	0.00	61	100.00	0	0.00
Wolfgang Schäuble	8	6.84	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Frank-Walter Steinmeier	7	5.98	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Gerhard Schröder	6	5.13	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Sigmar Gabriel	5	4.27	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
“German authorities”	4	3.42	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
others	26	22.22	0	0.00	26	100.00	0	0.00
total	117	100.00	0	0.00	117	100.00	0	0.00

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **Russia**

Russia	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Putin <sup>2</sup>	145	44.89	10	6.90	130	89.66	5	3.45
“Russian authorities”	32	9.91	0	0.00	32	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Lavrov	18	5.57	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
Alexander Chepurin	16	4.95	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Peskov	12	3.72	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Medvedev	9	2.79	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Sergey Shoygu	9	2.79	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	9	2.79	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Maria Zakharova	4	1.24	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00

Sergei Zheleznyak	4	1.24	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Embassy	3	0.93	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dmitry Rogozin	3	0.93	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	59	18.27	1	1.69	57	96.61	1	1.69
<b>total</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3.41</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>94.74</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1.86</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Distribution of the frequency and the value context of the presence of individual and collective foreign actors outside of the region: **The USA<sup>2</sup>**

The USA	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Donald Trump	214	28.05	4	1.87	190	88.79	20	9.35
Hillary Clinton	55	7.21	0	0.00	48	87.27	7	12.73
Barack Obama	55	7.21	0	0.00	51	92.73	4	7.27
CIA	22	2.88	0	0.00	16	72.73	6	27.27
American administration	22	2.88	0	0.00	16	72.73	6	27.27
Kyle Scott	21	2.75	0	0.00	19	90.48	2	9.52
"American authorities"	19	2.49	1	5.26	14	73.68	4	21.05
Bill Clinton	19	2.49	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
James Mattis	17	2.23	0	0.00	13	76.47	4	23.53
Joseph Biden	15	1.97	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
George Soros	15	1.97	0	0.00	7	46.67	8	53.33
Rex Tillerson	13	1.70	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
Melania Trump	12	1.57	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Mike Pence	11	1.44	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Michael Flynn	10	1.31	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Michelle Obama	9	1.18	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
FBI	9	1.18	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Pentagon	9	1.18	0	0.00	7	77.78	2	22.22
Ivanka Trump	7	0.92	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Madeleine Albright	7	0.92	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
George Bush	6	0.79	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00

<sup>2</sup> In both this and previous quarter we notice an increased number of actors from the USA (763). In the fourth quarter of 2016, number of actors from the USA is several times higher (871) compared to the third (396) and second (222) quarter of 2016. Although the number gradually drops in this quarter, it is still significantly higher in comparison to previous periods.

State Department	6	0.79	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
USA Congress	6	0.79	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Hoyt Brian Yee	6	0.79	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
David Petraeus	5	0.66	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
The Democratic Party of the United States of America	5	0.66	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
The USA Embassy in Priština	5	0.66	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Steve Bannon	4	0.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Sean Spicer	4	0.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Greg Delawie	4	0.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
The New York Times	4	0.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Maureen Cormack	4	0.52	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
The Washington Post	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Jared Kushner	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
The USA Embassy in Sarajevo	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Reince Priebus	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Matthew Palmer	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
John McCain	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
William Montgomery	3	0.39	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
The Republican Party	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Paul Ryan	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Henry Kissinger	3	0.39	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	113	14.81	2	1.77	107	94.69	4	3.54

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **EU institutions and representatives of EU institutions**

EU	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Federica Mogherini	58	18.01	0	0.00	56	96.55	2	3.45
EU	50	15.53	0	0.00	44	88.00	6	12.00
“European authorities”	33	10.25	0	0.00	24	72.73	9	27.27
Johannes Hahn	22	6.83	0	0.00	21	95.45	1	4.55
European Commission	20	6.21	0	0.00	20	100.00	0	0.00
Michael Davenport	15	4.66	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Maja Kocijančič	13	4.04	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
European Parliament	13	4.04	0	0.00	13	100.00	0	0.00
David McAllister	12	3.73	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Donald Tusk	11	3.42	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Jean-Claude Juncker	9	2.80	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00
Martin Schulz	7	2.17	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Natalija Apostolova	3	0.93	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Eurogroup	3	0.93	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
EU Delegation in Serbia	2	0.62	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
others	51	15.84	0	0.00	51	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>303</b>	<b>94.10</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>5.90</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **representatives of the organizations for protection of human rights and The Council of Europe**

Human rights	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
International Court of Justice in Hague	18	40.91	0	0.00	18	100.00	0	0.00
OSCE	10	22.73	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Council of Europe	6	13.64	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
European Court of Human Rights	5	11.36	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Nils Muižnieks	3	6.82	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	2	4.55	1	50.00	1	50.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2.27</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>97.73</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign political actors: **UN institutions and representatives of UN institutions**

UN	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
UN	17	42.50	0	0.00	17	100.00	0	0.00
UNESCO	8	20.00	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
SC UN	7	17.50	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
WHO	3	7.50	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	5	12.50	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign actors: **NATO**

NATO	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
NATO	102	74.45	0	0.00	70	68.63	32	31.37
Jens Stoltenberg	30	21.90	0	0.00	28	93.33	2	6.67
others	5	3.65	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>75.18</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24.82</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective actors:

**actors connected to the Hague Tribunal**

Hague Tribunal	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Hague Tribunal	31	27.43	0	0.00	29	93.55	2	6.45
Ratko Mladić	17	15.04	1	5.88	16	94.12	0	0.00
Radovan Karadžić	15	13.27	0	0.00	14	93.33	1	6.67
Veselin Šlivančanin	12	10.62	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Momčilo Krajišnik	6	5.31	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Jovica Stanišić	5	4.42	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Nikola Šainović	3	2.65	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	24	21.24	0	0.00	22	91.67	2	8.33
<b>Total</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>92.92</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6.19</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Even from a cursory overview of the frequency of appearances of certain actors on the front pages of our sampled daily newspapers, it is clear that the media unequally shows interest towards issues relating to domestic and foreign politics. The fact that foreign actors on the front pages of the daily newspapers in Serbia are present in a much smaller percentage (33.52 %, compared to 66.47% of the frequency of appearances of domestic political actors), showcases the interest of domestic media towards domestic politics, which in the interpretation of certain daily newspapers often takes on the shape of fiction - about which more was said in the analysis dealing with interpretative strategies in the medias' treatment of certain topics. The reasons for the noticeable absence of interest for economic actors and their understanding of the social, economic and political situation in both Serbia and the world is perplexing (in total 7.40% of the total actor sample is made out of economic actors), all exacerbated by the fact that in the narratives of many politicians, issues of economy and economic consolidation are emphasized as key elements of the future development strategies of Serbian society.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of **individual business/economic actors**

Economic actors – individual	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Miroslav Mišković	30	7.21	0	0.00	24	80.00	6	20.00
Predrag Ranković Peconi	18	4.33	0	0.00	17	94.44	1	5.56
Ivica Todorčić	17	4.09	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
Miodrag Kostić	16	3.85	0	0.00	16	100.00	0	0.00
Milorad Grčić	12	2.88	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00

Zoran Drobnjak	10	2.40	0	0.00	8	80.00	2	20.00
Dušan Bajatović	9	2.16	0	0.00	6	66.67	3	33.33
Milo Đurašković	8	1.92	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Srđan Milovanović	7	1.68	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Petar Matijević	6	1.44	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Mišković	6	1.44	0	0.00	4	66.67	2	33.33
Blagoje Spaskovski	6	1.44	0	0.00	3	50.00	3	50.00
Dmitar Đurović	6	1.44	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Veselin Jevrosimović	4	0.96	1	25.00	3	75.00	0	0.00
Nikola Petrović	4	0.96	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Marko Čadež	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milija Babović	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Popović	3	0.72	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Milan Beko	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Veroljub Dugalić	3	0.72	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	242	58.17	0	0.00	220	90.91	22	9.09
<b>total</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>374</b>	<b>89.90</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>9.86</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of **collective business/economic actors**

Economic actors – collective	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Elektroindustrija Srbije	38	6.24	0	0.00	28	73.68	10	26.32
RTB Bor	30	4.93	0	0.00	28	93.33	2	6.67
Železara Smederevo	19	3.12	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Srbijagas	19	3.12	0	0.00	17	89.47	2	10.53
Agrokor	17	2.79	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
NIS	17	2.79	0	0.00	14	82.35	3	17.65
Serbian Railways	14	2.30	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Petrohemija	13	2.13	2	15.38	10	76.92	1	7.69
Airport Nikola Tesla	12	1.97	1	8.33	11	91.67	0	0.00
Telekom Srbija	11	1.81	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Pošte Srbije	10	1.64	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Corridors of Serbia	9	1.48	0	0.00	9	100.00	0	0.00

Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia	9	1.48	1	11.11	7	77.78	1	11.11
Commercial bank	9	1.48	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
PKB	8	1.31	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Delhaize	8	1.31	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
Roads of Serbia	8	1.31	0	0.00	7	87.50	1	12.50
MSK Kikinda	8	1.31	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Azotara Pančevo	8	1.31	1	12.50	7	87.50	0	0.00
Fiat	7	1.15	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
AIK bank	6	0.99	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Gazprom	6	0.99	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Jugoimport SDPR	6	0.99	1	16.67	5	83.33	0	0.00
Air Serbia	6	0.99	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Al Dahra	6	0.99	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Galenika	6	0.99	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
MK group	5	0.82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Hesteel	5	0.82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
NALED	5	0.82	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Samsung	5	0.82	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Lazard	4	0.66	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Resavica	4	0.66	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Banka Intesa	4	0.66	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Poštanska štedionica	4	0.66	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
FAP Priboj	4	0.66	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Delta holding	4	0.66	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dipos	4	0.66	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Aktor	3	0.49	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Etihad	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Goša	3	0.49	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Findomestik bank	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vensi	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Fraport	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Merkator S	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Frikom	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Srbijašume	3	0.49	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	224	36.78	1	0.45	215	95.98	8	3.57
total	609	100.00	8	1.31	558	91.63	43	7.06

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective foreign business/economic actors:

IMF - World Bank	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
IMF	17	50.00	0	0.00	16	94.12	1	5.88
World Bank	6	17.65	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
James Roaf	5	14.71	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ellen Goodstein	4	11.76	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
others	2	5.88	0	0.00	2	100.00	0	0.00
Total	34	100.00	0	0.00	33	97.06	1	2.94

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Besides the political and business actors that have already been mentioned, the protagonists found on the front pages are various other social actors, who have in a number of different ways influenced the social and political circumstances in Serbian society. Based on the gathered empirical framework, we have categorized them into:

(a) representatives of independent and autonomous government bodies and institutions, (b) analysts of political, social, economic, security and other circumstances, (c) representatives of the Serbian orthodox church and other religious organizations (d) media actors, (e) representatives of judicial authorities, (f) attorneys and protagonists of various judicial proceedings and (h) protagonists of media and other affairs.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective domestic actors: **representatives of independent bodies**

Independent bodies	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Agency for Combating Corruption	19	22.62	0	0.00	19	100.00	0	0.00
Rodoljub Šabić	11	13.10	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Janković	7	8.33	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Pavle Petrović	5	5.95	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Council for Combating Corruption	4	4.76	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
National Educational Council	4	4.76	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Fiscal council	3	3.57	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Aleksandar Lipkovski	3	3.57	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
State Audit Institution	3	3.57	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	25	29.76	0	0.00	23	92.00	2	8.00
<b>total</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>97.62</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2.38</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors: **representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and other religious organizations**

Religion	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
SOC	27	13.99	0	0.00	24	88.89	3	11.11
Irinej, Serbian Patriarch	27	13.99	3	11.11	23	85.19	1	3.70
Aloysius Stepinac	18	9.33	0	0.00	12	66.67	6	33.33
Pope Francis	11	5.70	1	9.09	10	90.91	0	0.00
Porfirije, Metropolitan of Zagreb and Ljubljana	8	4.15	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Roman Catholic Church	7	3.63	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Patriarch Pavle	6	3.11	2	33.33	4	66.67	0	0.00
Amfilohije, Metropolitan bishop of Montenegro and the Littoral	5	2.59	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Irinej, Bishop of Bačka	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Islamic Community of Serbia	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Muhamed Jusuf-spahić	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Teodosije, bishop	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Russian Orthodox Church	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	64	33.16	0	0.00	59	92.19	5	7.81
<b>total</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3.11</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>89.12</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7.77</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of the representatives the Serbian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations on the front pages of the various media from the research sample

Media	Number	%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	94	48.70
<i>Politika</i>	35	18.13
<i>Alo!</i>	17	8.81
<i>Kurir</i>	13	6.74
<i>Blic</i>	13	6.74
<i>Danas</i>	12	6.22
<i>Informer</i>	9	4.66
<b>Total</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors from the **media**<sup>3</sup>

Media	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dragan J. Vučićević	11	5.73	0	0.00	10	90.91	1	9.09
Kurir	10	5.21	0	0.00	6	60.00	4	40.00
KRIK	8	4.17	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
NIN	8	4.17	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
RTS	7	3.65	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Olja Bečković	7	3.65	0	0.00	4	57.14	3	42.86
Milomir Marić	7	3.65	0	0.00	6	85.71	1	14.29
Informer	6	3.13	0	0.00	5	83.33	1	16.67
Zoran Kesić	5	2.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Danas	5	2.60	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Ljiljana Smajlović	5	2.60	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Nedim Sejdinović	5	2.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
N1	5	2.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00

<sup>3</sup> The actors who were the subjects of the reportage of other media, and media houses on whose work other media reported on, have been presented.

Aleksandar Rodić	5	2.60	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
NUNS	5	2.60	0	0.00	2	40.00	3	60.00
Ratko Dmi-trović	5	2.60	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Pink	4	2.08	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Happy	4	2.08	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Željko Cvijanović	4	2.08	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Vreme	4	2.08	0	0.00	2	50.00	2	50.00
Vukašin Obradović	4	2.08	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Željko Mitrović	3	1.56	1	33.33	2	66.67	0	0.00
RTV	2	1.04	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
others	63	32.81	1	1.59	57	90.48	5	7.94
<b>total</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>82.29</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>16.67</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

During the collection of the empirical data, it was observed again that the headlines contained a significant presence of actors related the activities of the judicial and investigative authorities. The actors in this group are shown as representatives of the judicial authority (193), lawyers (87) and other protagonists of active or completed court / investigative procedures (491). In the last quarter of 2016, as already mentioned when the issues were discussed, the readers were referred to a number of judicial and investigative procedures, with the presentation of all the actors who were arrested, have witnessed or suffered in each other's accounts. In this quarter, various investigations and proceedings shed from the courtrooms, prosecution offices, prisons and police stations into the headlines of daily newspapers.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual and collective domestic social actors from the: **representatives of judicial authorities**

judicial authorities	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade	15	7.77	0	0.00	15	100.00	0	0.00
High Court in Belgrade	12	6.22	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
War Crimes Prosecutor's Office	10	5.18	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Special Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime	8	4.15	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Supreme Court of Cassation	8	4.15	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Milan Petrović	6	3.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Lidija Alagić	6	3.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Court of Appeal in Belgrade	6	3.11	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Commercial Court in Belgrade	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
The High Judicial Council	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
First Basic Court in Belgrade	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Special court in Belgrade	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime	4	2.07	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
High court in Smederevo	3	1.55	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Republic Public Attorney	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tatjana Babić	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
First Basic Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nata Mesarović	3	1.55	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Dragana Boljević	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Vukčević	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Vida Petrović Škero	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00

Notary public chamber of Serbia	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Slađana Bojković	3	1.55	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	72	37.31	0	0.00	69	95.83	3	4.17
<b>total</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>96.89</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3.11</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **lawyers**

Lawyers	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Vladimir Gajić	6	6.90	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Nebojša Vlajić	5	5.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Borivoje Borović	5	5.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubomir Pantović	5	5.75	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zdenko Tomanović	4	4.60	0	0.00	3	75.00	1	25.00
Goran Petronijević	4	4.60	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Zora Dobričanin Nikodinović	3	3.45	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Dragan Krajnović	3	3.45	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Bar Association of Serbia	3	3.45	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
others	49	56.32	0	0.00	49	100.00	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>98.85</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.15</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **actors of judicial proceedings and investigations**

Actors of judicial proceedings and investigations	number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Dušan Spasojević Šiptar	27	5.50	0	0.00	22	81.48	5	18.52
Milorad Ulemek Legija	19	3.87	0	0.00	14	73.68	5	26.32
Aleksandar Stanković Sale Mutavi	18	3.67	0	0.00	16	88.89	2	11.11
Luka Bojović	15	3.05	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Slobodan Šaranović	15	3.05	0	0.00	12	80.00	3	20.00
Veljko Belivuk Velja Nevolja	14	2.85	0	0.00	6	42.86	8	57.14
Željko Rutović	12	2.44	0	0.00	7	58.33	5	41.67

Nikola Bojović	12	2.44	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Ljubiša Buha Čume	11	2.24	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Mile Luković Kum	11	2.24	0	0.00	8	72.73	3	27.27
Željko Ražnatović Arkan	11	2.24	0	0.00	11	100.00	0	0.00
Vlastimir Milošević	10	2.04	0	0.00	10	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Stojanović Keka	9	1.83	0	0.00	4	44.44	5	55.56
Darko Šarić	9	1.83	0	0.00	8	88.89	1	11.11
Miladin Suvajdžić	8	1.63	0	0.00	8	100.00	0	0.00
Zvezdan Jovanović	7	1.43	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Milomir Jovanović	7	1.43	0	0.00	2	28.57	5	71.43
Branislav Šaranović	7	1.43	0	0.00	7	100.00	0	0.00
Dejan Milenković Bagzi	6	1.22	0	0.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Sretko Kalinić	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Mirko Milošević	5	1.02	0	0.00	1	20.00	4	80.00
Ivan Ćirić Ćira	5	1.02	0	0.00	3	60.00	2	40.00
Milorad Bračanović	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Rodoljub Radulović Miša Banana	5	1.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Željko Maksimović Maka	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Dobrosav Gavrić	4	0.81	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
Goran Kovačević Goranac	4	0.81	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Andrija Drašković	3	0.61	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
Dragan Ilić Limar	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Nenad Ćurčić	3	0.61	0	0.00	1	33.33	2	66.67
Nebojša Joksović	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Tomislav Milovanović Toma Hekler	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Ratko Romić	3	0.61	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
Miloš Simović	3	0.61	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
others	205	41.75	0	0.00	142	69.27	63	30.73
<b>total</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>75.36</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>24.64</b>

Source: Mediameter research, January - March 2017



In the following table, the actors whom the sampled media connected to the murder of the singer Jelena Marjanović, and her family members, associates and friends have been presented. These actors have been present in 968 front pages in the second quarter of 2016, almost two times more than, for example, foreign politicians or government bodies and institutions. Even though this media-constructed affair is still present on the front pages of the analyzed daily newspaper in the third quarter, interest began to significantly wane, and so later only 166 appearances have been recorded. In the fourth trimester, that number began to rise yet again, regardless of how much time has passed since the murder, and so on the front pages there were 193 appearances of the actors connected to Jelena Marjanović. In the first quarter of 2017, we have noted a significant drop of media interest for this case – 83 texts have been published in this period.

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **“The Murder of Jelena Marjanović”**

The Murder of Jelena Marjanović	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
Jelena Marjanović	27	32.53	0	0.00	27	100.00	0	0.00
Zoran Marjanović	21	25.30	0	0.00	19	90.48	2	9.52
Jana Marjanović	12	14.46	0	0.00	12	100.00	0	0.00
Vladimir Marjanović	5	6.02	0	0.00	4	80.00	1	20.00
Zorica Krsmanović	5	6.02	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Zorica Marjanović	4	4.82	0	0.00	4	100.00	0	0.00
The Marjanović family	4	4.82	0	0.00	1	25.00	3	75.00
Miloš Marjanović	3	3.61	0	0.00	2	66.67	1	33.33
others	2	2.41	1	50.00	1	50.00	0	0.00
<b>total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1.20</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>90.36</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8.43</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

Frequency distribution and the contextual values of appearances of individual domestic social actors: **“Savamala”**

Savamala	Number	%	positive	%	neutral	%	negative	%
The <i>Ne Davimo Beograd</i> initiative	14	56.00	0	0.00	13	92.86	1	7.14
Dobrica Veselinović	5	20.00	0	0.00	5	100.00	0	0.00
Ksenija Radovanović	3	12.00	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
other	3	12.00	0	0.00	3	100.00	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>96.00</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4.00</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

UNNAMED SOURCES

In the selected front page articles from the sampled media, unnamed sources have also been the second most prominent actor. This time there were 571 instances of quoting anonymous sources, or rather 23.76% captions, which was almost identical to the results from the previous quarter (24.26%). The widespread usage of unnamed sources has been precisely determined thanks to the manner of qualifying anonymous sources, which we have been applying since the second *Mediameter* issue, so as to not only classify those sources which the very media has defined as anonymous, but also those who provide information that cannot be verified, no matter the manner in which they have been incorporated into an article. Of course, the presence of information gained from anonymous sources speaks more about the manner of the reporting done by the seven media found in our sample, than about the actual need of protecting the identities of the individual who provide certain information. As Matt Carlson, in his book “On the Condition of Anonymity” has said: “Journalism is woven into the fabric of our environment, and in turn is based on it, meaning that it can never be an objective observer, as it is claimed...These sorts of questions are better answered through an approach that recognizes the culture of unnamed sources as a *culture*. This view steers an inquiry into unnamed sources away from frequency and implementation, toward issues of meanings that we share and patterns of collective interpretation between journalists, sources and the public. The securing of anonymity is not just a question of technique. It is, actually, a request for a certain type of imagining of relations between these three sides.”<sup>4</sup>

The journalistic form that contains the greatest number of information received from unnamed sources is the report. Of the 1718 articles written in this form, 488 or 28.41% contain anonymous sources.

Participation of “unnamed sources” in all journalistic forms, in the seven sampled media

Genre	total number of articles	unnamed sources	%
report	1718	488	28.41
news article	274	73	26.64
news	56	8	14.29
commentary	105	2	1.90
interview	204	0	0.00
other	19	0	0.00
journalistic coverage	27	0	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>2403</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>23.76</b>

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

4 M. Carlson, *On the condition of anonymity*, Urbana, Chicago, Springfield, University of Illinois Press, 2011, 7

The greatest number of articles whose information originates from anonymous sources compared to the total number of published articles in a certain media was found in the *Informer* (40.71%). However, the highest number of texts coming from unnamed sources has been recorded in *Večernje novosti* (103 – 23.9%). Next is *Kurir*, having more than a third of their articles coming from anonymous sources (37.65% - 96), and after that *Alo!* (32.62%) and *Blic* (22.58%). A significantly lower number of articles based on this type of information gathering was noted for *Politika* (15.21% - 73) and *Danas* (12.36% - 54).

Number of “unnamed sources” based on the analyzed media

Media	total number of articles	unnamed sources	%
<i>Informer</i>	226	92	40.71%
<i>Kurir</i>	255	96	37.65%
<i>Alo!</i>	233	76	32.62%
<i>Večernje novosti</i>	431	103	23.90%
<i>Blic</i>	341	77	22.58%
<i>Politika</i>	480	73	15.21%
<i>Danas</i>	437	54	12.36%
Total	2403	571	23.76%

Source: *Mediameter research*, January - March 2017

## Conclusion

The first quarter of 2017 was spent in an intensive media campaign related, primarily, to the presidential elections. The number of analyzed texts in seven daily newspapers increased by a quarter compared to the same period last year. What was particular for these three months, in terms of media, was a kind of hybridization of topics, linking various events and actors, the so-called current news, which can hardly be classified as “specific topics”, such as the current policy, crime, entertainment, society, economy... This balance of texts is still very low. Sources are often unknown and mysterious, as well as the ways in which very personal and intimate information about various personalities are revealed. The media are increasingly and clearly opting for their political and ethical choices. The degree of journalistic skill and adherence to professional ethical standards records a further decline.

(Footnotes)

1 Velimir Ilić and Nova Srbija have declined support to ruling coalition in January 2017.

2 In the previous 8 quarters President of Russia Vladimir Putin was the most represented actor, which was not the case in the first quarter of 2017.

4



Discourse  
analysis

DEJAN VUK STANKOVIĆ

## DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

### Presidential elections – fierce polemical charge and substantial lack of rational political debate

In the period of January-March 2017, Presidential elections were a central topic of all dailies and weeklies in Serbia, and with a number of good reasons. Among many, two seem the most important. Politics, even outside of election cycles, represent a central focal point in all the print media. The announcement of the elections and the election campaign itself, further increased the monitoring level of the key political actors' activities. This trend is quite standard in all democratic societies, and in this respect Serbia does not differ from other European and non-European democracies. Another reason for a thorough and intensive monitoring of the presidential race is reflected in the importance of the presidential elections in Serbian political life.

Although according to the current Serbian Constitution, the President has a very narrow set of legal powers, two circumstances clearly emphasize the importance of this function. Firstly, the President is the only state function directly elected; therefore, presidential elections are the cornerstone of political legitimacy in democratic terms. Secondly, presidential elections victories of Vojislav Kostunica over Slobodan Milosevic, or Tomislav Nikolić over Boris Tadić, affected the change in the entire political elite in power and suggested the conceptual changes in the political life of the country. In short, the political stake in the presidential elections significantly surpasses the actual legal framework of the presidential authority in the period during which they perform the function. Taking into account all these circumstances, after the end of the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2016, even some media and opposition political figures encouraged the political-media narrative about the critical significance of the presidential elections in the spring of this year.

During the presidential campaign, print media showed almost matching trends to those when the country and society are not in the state of the pre-election campaign. Pictures of the key political actors, formed within different discourses in the public and political field are predominantly negative, while the interpretations of events, including the electoral process, stand strongly opposed and mutually in contrast to each other. The focus of writing is concentrated on challenging, questioning and discrediting the political opponent, with noticeably fewer stories on presenting concrete solutions and different conceptual ideas.

Also, it is clear that on the basic level, freedom of thought and speech are in place, as the discourse of the presidential elections was such that there were no political or ideological arguments that were eliminated from the public discourse. The presence of political and ideological pluralism of attitudes and the diversity of approaches to actors, events and processes, is such that there is absolutely no consensus on any political actor, event or a process. The divisions are deep and ultimate, almost fatal. Despite

strong polemical charge and the main intent to persuade and not rationalize, writing of the print media is not different from any other usual dynamics of political processes in a democratic society.

In addition to the polemics between the participants of the political debate, there was a distinct level of polemics between the media themselves. In a sharp political conflict, media are not displaced as a social factor that merely conveys certain messages and has its own purpose of existence and functioning outside of political daily disputes. On the contrary, they are active participants in a vibrant, sharp and somewhat exhausting social and political daily debate.

In addition to the articles and columns, a significant part in shaping the weeklies' discourse, lies in the interviews given during the campaign, whether by presidential candidates, or the members of the politically interested public, engaged intellectuals, who act in accordance with either their local traditions or global trends, and as such represent an integral part of the public and political discussion in a democracy.

There is a significant and obvious, almost complete rhetorical overlap in the content of political messages that being conveyed by the journalists and those advocated for by the political actors. This statement applies both to the media that are in the alignment with the political and moral positions of the ruling elite, but also the media representing political views of the opposition. Political and media opposition, together with a part of civil society sector, have formed a sort of their own headquarters on the political scene. Synergy of the effects of different actors continually strives to stimulate and restore the significant, undoubtedly lost, interest in the "political matter" of the opposition.

Therefore, one should not be surprised that the media scene, viewed from the perspective of the front pages of weekly newspapers, articles that are connected to the front pages, interviews, commentaries and editorial columns, testifies to the high levels of intellectual dynamism, intense political debate of the engaged intellectuals, and propagandist manner of journalism which aims to persuade, rather than to explore the topics and question the argumentative complexities in the political and public arena.

In short, journalism in weekly papers carries a significant level of daily politics, however not daily politics as a legitimate topic for media analysis, but a more activist approach, the one that promotes and calls for action. Therefore, it is understandable where the impressions and word choices on the front pages, sharpness of political messages, suggestive images or propaganda cartoons derive from. In addition to this, there is a strong tendency for the overlap in values and political attitudes of interviewers and interviewees, who do not come directly from the sphere of politics, but in most cases, reflect the attitudes of politicians that they explicitly advocate for. Model of critical writing is often in the form of negative personified campaign, namely a media form that focuses on the Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, who is seen as the main protagonist of politics in Serbia. Negative obsession with Vučić's personality and his politics, brings together different genres of journalism, journalists, participants in interviews, cartoonists and politicians who grasp a significant presence in print media.

As in previous periods covered by the survey, interview as a journalistic genre was the most prominent media form during the campaign for the presidential elections as well. It is a continuous process of discussions with the predominantly opposing intellectuals, activists from the civil society sector, but also representatives of independent legal bodies, such as the Commissioner for the Information or the Ombudsman. Emphasizing of the interview goes along with the front-page visual concept, where interviewee is always photographed in a close up. In this way, the political message is highlighted as well, while suggestively indicating the acceptance of their way of thinking. Visually, the front pages of the weeklies remind of political party posters, with an attempt to emphasize the importance of a specific person.

In addition, a short message on the front page in the form of the interview title, serves the same purpose. Persistence in making the interviewee's message significant, directly seeks to brand them as a political opinion-maker, a trademark of a certain political group. Also notable is the continued tendency that a particular part of the public is positioned as a top authority in the analysis of social and historical processes, events, decisions and actions of the central political figures.

The greatest numbers of weeklies, almost all except for *Pečat*, support the opposition, particularly the Euro-reformers. Its views are either justified or, more precisely, directly or indirectly defended, while the parties in power are either excluded from the debate (*NIN* and *Vreme*), or reduced to a position that they have to speak positively about themselves.

Contrasted with that of a ruling party, critical opposition discourse is carefully developed and planned in detail. Starting from the general and determined political issues related to the main principles, structure and functioning of the government, through specific topics that are reoccurring such as "Savamala" affair, ending with topics that have immediate events or wider political and social processes as a pretext.

An important feature of oppositional discourse is "fixing the image" of the political actor who is the subject of critical analysis. Fixing the image of an actor or an event is one of the most common weapons in the political and propaganda war. Fixing the image is a process in which the actor remains the same as always, more precisely the same as in the near and in distant past, despite his potential and actual transformations and essentially changing political, economic and wider social and historical circumstances. This pseudo-intellectual matrix operates on the principle of assigned roles. Actors are placed in a public space based on the "good" and "bad" guys paradigm.

"Exclusive" right to the image of a "villain" was given to the ruling party, more precisely, its leader. The opposition is not represented as "the embodiment of individual and political virtues", but the tone is much less sharp and politically accusing, with a noticeable regret that the opposition is "not doing better" in the political arena. Regarding the mentioned tone of writing, positive moral and political attributes are often ascribed to a particular group of political figures and organizations, while the negative ones are irrevocably and unquestionably assigned to the opposite side. Manichean division of the political and media elite is in the center of the conflict in the public and political arena. Consequently, weeklies are biased, and they are very clear about it. This statement applies both to Euro-reformative weeklies that radically criticize the government, but also to the national and antiglobalization media, i.e. the weekly *Pečat* who mercilessly criticize globalization, the hegemony of liberalism in politics and economics, geopolitical supremacy of the United States, but also failed pro-Western parties and intellectuals who led Serbia until 2012.

Weeklies can be divided in two categories. According to the criterion of division common in a democratic society, they should be divided to the ones close to the ruling party's ideology, and those that are moderately or radically critical of the same. In Serbia, this criterion for division cannot be used consistently for the simple reason that all weeklies in Serbia are either partially or completely critical of the party in power. Weekly *Pečat* falls under the category of partially critical of the authorities, because of its open criticizing of the government's pro-European foreign policy under the Vučić's rule. However, this weekly shows strong critical stance towards moral credibility, axiological orientation and political views of the 5th October winners.

On the other hand, weeklies like *NIN*, *Vreme*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* fall under the category of completely critical of the government. There is however a difference in the tone of criticism. While *Vreme* and somewhat *NIN* (especially the domain of domestic politics and economics) are completely, directly

and fiercely criticizing the government, weeklies *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* apply a more moderate tone in expressing critical views. Their level of accusing and labeling is far lower than in the cases of *Vreme* and *NIN*.

Another classification that can be applied to the weeklies is their foreign policy orientation. *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* are more or less pro-European. On the other hand, the weekly *Pečat* clearly emphasizes the anti-Western and pro-Russian stance, intended to support the nationalist discourse, close to the one which was dominant in wars in the 90's.

**Image of the presidential candidate Aleksandar Vučić - an autocrat with dictatorial ambitions, obsessed with the power-trip, a true non-democrat, intolerant towards the media, psychologically unstable personality, irreverent, a demagogue, a master of scandals, a consequence of deep decadence in the society.**

The image of the government, namely its main protagonist Aleksandar Vučić, who was also the candidate of the ruling coalition in the presidential elections, is not structurally different from the image that has been created about him in last few years, in most of the Serbian weekly magazines. On top of this, the sharpness in the expression of negative attitude increased significantly during the campaign, primarily for the purposes of encouraging the negative attitudes with a large number of citizens. The style of writing that primarily incited indignation, anger and protest, should have served as a media platform for the voice of protest with wider layers of population.

Aleksandar Vučić, the leader of Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and a person with the highest rating within the electoral body, is portrayed in public as a politician with a high degree of authoritarianism and unambiguous tendency towards dictatorship. Alongside the political preferences, his extremely negative portrait is boosted in the moral and psychological sense as well. A leading politician in Serbia is described as an immoral and irrational person by many authors and in a significant number of interviews with opposition candidates and public figures. Merging of the political and moral-psychological description of Vučić's personality and political practice, was followed by an unambiguous tendency to undermine all other aspects of his politics: from economic, where failures were emphasized and successes diminished, to the domestic policy context and the foreign policy orientation of the country. At home, Vučić is portrayed as the enemy of freedom and democracy, intolerant of media and political opponents and a skillful creator of numerous scandals through which he conceals the failures that his politics experiences in every field.

The context for such system and practice of government is a child of the spiritual and social constellations, primarily of political circumstances. The crucial among them is the historical-political demise of the 5th October winners, the parties that were in the opposition to Slobodan Milosevic, which declaratively advocated for liberal-democratic values and turned to the West as a focal point of Serbian politics. Their historical failure was "the birthmother" of SNS and Vučić. However, Vučić's success is an example of the general socio-historical plunging at a large scale, as the writer and political activist Dragan Velikić explained: "After the 5th October 2000, there was a light at the end of the tunnel. It seemed that the healing process of the Serbian society began and that the doom and gloom of Milosevic's Socialists and Šešelj's Radicals - went to the dump of history. Few suspected at the time that it was possible for Serbia to be re-diagnosed with the same disease. Given the fact that after 5th October lustration was not implemented, the disease was only lying low, waiting for its moment. And when eight years later Serbian Radical Party (SRS) virus mutated into a SNS virus, many believed that splitting of Radicals, with Šešelj in The Hague, introduced Serbia into the group of normal countries where the disturbing factor is maintained at ten percent. Unfortunately, instead of the unshakable energy in restoring unambiguous

civil values, old-men roaming and blind walk in the dark began, as a direct consequence of disastrous cohabitations which erased basic ethical parameters, without which no one could tell anymore right from left and good from bad. The bottom again climbed to the top... Unfinished people continued to build an unfinished state. The ghosts of the nineties entered in full force, strengthened with the fifth-column rejects of democratic parties, and took over the power again, thanks to the catastrophic 'white voting-sheets' mess. For the white voting sheets did not stay white after the elections. They blended into the nameless shades of human stupidity. Public repentance of some of the proponents of this political suicide is in vain today. How naive was the belief that the blank voting sheets would punish the Democrats and that even with the Progressives in power things could not get worse. Time soon proved that the bottom has no bottom."<sup>1</sup>

Velikić's article shows many interconnected features in the radical-critical narrative that is continually repeated today. SNS is a party similar to the aggressive and nationalist SRS, that advocates for anti-European policy and seeks historical and political justification of war, made up of people of low moral character, without professional competence, incapable to accept democracy and civilized modern life. Between the enlightened Serbia and the unenlightened Progressives lies the final and irrevocable division. The ethos of distance is a key political position. Showing contempt towards SNS and its candidate became a moral imperative for anyone who wanted and sought a democratically organized state and civilized way of life.

The one-up position of SNS critics can be summed up into one storyline - stigmatization of Aleksandar Vučić as Serbia's leading politician. Vučić is an anti-democratic, authoritarian politician who is sliding towards dictatorship. Although on the surface it appears that he enjoys the support of the public, Vučić's power is based on fear and media manipulation. These attitudes are supported by the "joint work" of media, engaged intellectuals and presidential candidates. Examples of these political views and the accompanying rhetoric can be identified in the following places: i.e. the former Democratic Party leader, MP and university professor of sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, Dragoljub Mićunović, said: "We have no democracy, Serbia is not a democratic country. The coup was executed through the suspension of the parliament, so that the Prime Minister does not hear the words he doesn't like during the election campaign. Along with the series of legal violations and malpractices, the suspension of the National Assembly, the retaining the prime minister's function during the presidential campaign, the mobilization of all state resources in the campaign, the blocking of almost all print and digital media for the other candidates, with the populist, aggressive rhetoric full of hatred, unfounded accusations, intimidation and threats, the Prime Minister's campaign divided the electorate into 'the people' or those who love him, and 'degenerates', those who don't like him, who 'hate him', envy him, 'who sold themselves', 'traitors and mercenaries'. We will again listen to the long-forgotten music and the famous words: 'I am the people, you are traitors and mercenaries, I am a patriot, you are the servants of the others'. Everything is well known, the songs and the singers, but it remains to be seen whether the audience is deaf ... Autocracy can be fierce, just as tyranny, despotism or dictatorship. It can be a harsh or mild, but in both cases the 'leader' holds all the power. It occurs quietly in most cases, people do not notice it, like entering the warm water. They are getting used to it little by little. And, when an authoritarian assumes authority, slightly breaking the law, slightly stepping out of the legal framework, slightly ignoring and disregarding the institutions, more and more people remain marginalized. By the time we get sober, one man is deciding on everything. The rule of one man is therefore the enemy of democracy."<sup>2</sup>

1 Dragan Velikić, „Pedeset nijansi bele [Fifty shades of white],” *NIN*, no. 3455, p. 29.

2 Dragoljub Mićunović, „Vučić je postao država [Vučić has become the state],” interview with Tanja Nikolić Đaković, *NIN*, no. 3454, p. 10



NIN, 9th March 2017

With the same message about the undemocratic character of the government, politically engaged theatre director Stevan Filipović addresses the public with categorical and extremely accusatory views of the current government led by Aleksandar Vučić: “the situation could become only worse - we see something that is an authoritarian form of government, seriously slipping into dictatorship, rather bare and open dictatorship, which is primarily reflected in the non-functioning institutions.”<sup>3</sup>

In Aleksandar Vučić’s candidacy for the president of Serbia, MP and retired university professor of psychology, Žarko Korać, does not see anything but the bare desire for power and a tactical maneuver that separates him from the responsibility for what he promised, but did not fulfill. The image of Vučić as a selfish politician who only thinks about his hypertrophic “I” devoid of any political responsibility, is seen also in the following sections of Korać’s interview: “I would say there are two reasons for this, the first being that even Vučić himself does not believe that he will have this amount of power and that his reign and supremacy of SNS will last in the next five years. The president is elected for five years cycle, and this guarantees him undisturbed power, which he enjoys very much. He does this out of precaution and thinks that it ensures his position, which he awarded to himself, as some kind of a Serbian Prometheus who leads the county to the bright future. He therefore talks about himself without any self-criticism, along with those known sentences like ‘it does not matter, I’ll pay the price with my head if I have to’. The second reason is a little more complicated; as a Prime Minister, he made a lot of promises about investments, standard growth, salaries and it is clear that he didn’t deliver. For the moment, he is managing to avoid answers to these questions by creating huge media noise and propaganda. But I think people will slowly begin to demand answers, and if he is not the Prime Minister, the (new) Prime Minister will have to address these. And then Vučić can dismiss the Prime Ministers and ministers. So to speak, he is stepping out to the “safe-zone” where he will not be questioned as much about the standards of living. He is retaining power, but somehow getting out of direct responsibility.”<sup>4</sup>

Korać’s use of the construction authoritarian system and personality shows that pseudo-psychological analysis can have direct effects on daily politics. Korać’s wish to diminish Vučić’s democratic orientation and authentic foundation of the party and the electorate culminates in the following quote: “What worries me are the following two characteristics of an authoritarian society and personality. The first is so-called authoritarian submission. Vučić has brought the system of submission to its limits. I could not believe that, apart from North Korea, there is a country in which all the committees and all the members of the General Committee unanimously support one man. Objectively, he is their best candidate, but the very fact that no one even thinks that it would be a good idea for him to remain a prime minister, it is almost unbelievable. Even Broz, who had a much more real power and authority, and of course, real historical merit, had some opponents; not here. And this passed without much discussion in the public. Along with this authoritarian submission, goes the authoritarian aggression, directed against all those who are politically different, and this makes political life in Serbia unbearable.”<sup>5</sup>

The multitude of articles on Vučić’s role in the election campaign includes a special section that highlights the parallels between Vučić and various non-liberal-democratic political leaders prone to authoritarian practices. In this regard, a concise analogy is offered by the Editor in Chief of *Vreme*, Dragoljub Žarković, who is known for his sarcastic political manner with a halo of “profound” thought: “already the voices can be heard that Vučić should be the new Putin or Erdogan, politicians who turned personal

popularity into a personal power, either tacitly, or through attempts to provide legitimacy for their policy on a referendum.”<sup>6</sup>

Žarković’s critical analysis of the current political moment is appropriately similar to the conclusions about the political situation offered by the Euro-reformist presidential candidate, former Ombudsman Saša Janković who says: “The problem is represented, extremely sharply, in one man, who has seized all branches of government and acts as the owner Serbia. He rules by fear, lies and propaganda. Destroys the institutions, the Constitution, the laws, the main foundations of civilized countries. *However, this is not about him, but about the autocratic system has only changed the main conductor for decades now, and the latter is the most brutal. I am advocating for the change in the system of arbitrary, unlimited power and for the system that no one will be able to misuse, or abuse any of the institutions, or in case they do, other institutions will react... The destructive stubbornness is not a policy.* Vučić is trying to downgrade us in everything, while strongly dividing us into two opposing blocks. He simulates politics through daily press conferences. With the inevitable bragging and pathetic rhetoric, he overwhelms us with irrelevant data, along with daily intrigues and fantastic stories of hidden weapons, ambassadorial conspiracies and millions of dollars for coups, that exist only in his and his tabloids’ worlds. When this phase in history is over, a devastating fact will remain, that so many people, for such a long time, took seriously a person who did not even take himself seriously.”<sup>7</sup>

Vučić’s political agenda and media strategy endemically connect not only the political and media circumstances, they have a broader psychosocial and cultural-traditional foundation. Vučić bases his media message on management of fear and control of expectations, but also on the patriarchal mindset and ethos that are historically sedimented in the collective unconscious of the Serbian people. This message of manipulating, un-emancipated character of his political practice and communication strategy is given by the marketing expert Nadežda Milenković, the author of promo videos for the opposition candidate Saša Janković and a longtime opposition activist.

In the interview for *Vreme* she says, “Constant message since he took power is – it is either me or nothing. Without me, the plane will crash and there will be no bread, nor games. Well, this is not even original, because the same agency sells similar ideas in various under-developed democracies, but the fact remains that you send a message that there is only one saviour. I do not know is the aim of such campaign, if not to crown him for ever and ever, for hundreds of years, that if, nothing else, his tombstone leads us. This of course, rests on the fairytale of the “Serbian host”, and a “firm hand”. In fact, we’re talking about a deep patriarchy, with set roles in the household and society. There is one dude who pounds his fist on the table, who knows everything and who decides on everything. Vučić fits into this stereotype, and naturally, since we are in patriarchy, has his audience that it approves of him.”<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the psycho-cultural profile, Vučić’s electoral base also nourishes a peculiar moral, or even, economic and social model, which is usually qualified as clientelism. It is an implicit contract between the holder of political power, in this case Aleksandar Vučić, and the electorate that demonstrates its loyalty exclusively based on their selfish, primarily financial reasons.

3 Stevan Filipović, „Kako da ga što brže sklonimo [How to remove him as soon as possible],” interview with Radmilo Marković, *Vreme*, no. 1366

4 Žarko Korać, „Vučiću treba još pet godina vlasti [Vucic needs five more years in power],” interview with Nadežda Gaće, *Novi magazin*, no. 304, p. 18

5 Ibid, p. 20

6 Dragoljub Žarković, „Junačka izborna predanja –njih deset, a ja i mojih deset kompanjona sami [Heroic election stories: ten of them, and me with my ten buddies alone],” *Vreme*, no. 1367, p. 7

7 Saša Janković, „Okončaćemo vladavinu straha, laži i nasilja [We’ll end the reign of fear, lies and violence],” interview with Tamara Skrozza, *Vreme*, no. 1362

8 Nadežda Milenković, „Srbija pod okupacijom vlasti [Serbia under the occupation of the Government],” interview with Ivana Milanović Hrašovec, *Vreme*, no. 1367

The assumption of this “political-economic quid pro quo” lies in the political reasoning of voters who are deprived of any valuable judgment of politics. This is represented in the statement of already mentioned director Stevan Filipović, who explicitly says: “Socialist party (SPS) or Vučić can say what they want because their voters lead themselves by the clientelist principle: I will be good, or I have to steal, smuggle, or be scared. They do not care; these people will always vote for the SPS and Vučić... it seems to me that they have no real values. If there are no values, then what is left is a false sense of security, the goods that every populist sells. Secondly, the question is also how these people are formatted, and here we come back to my field. The new populists know the drill, they don’t reinvent the wheel. For them, whatever gives them the ability to format the people to be even more frantic, frightened, uneducated, wild and aggressive- is a valuable weapon. And when you have such a citizen, then it is no longer a citizen in the classical sense of the democratic process; rather it is only someone reacting to the spin.”

In addition to the clientelist relationship between “leaders” and “subordinates” which is firmly placed and severe, but unexplained, rationally and factually undocumented, there is also a deep research “finding” of the specifically “authoritarian character of the Serbian public political culture.” This “deep” figure of thought, is part of a wider social context that explains Vučić’s primacy over other candidates. Promotion of this theory is a unique “media assignment” of the sociologist Srećko Mihailović, researcher of Demostat, a trade union activist, scholar and an intellectual of left orientation who says: “our political culture has a subservient character, citizens are authoritarian, little democratically oriented, actually anti-political and apolitical. Accordingly, it should be noted that the authoritarian nature of our political culture directly corresponds to the candidate Aleksandar Vučić.”<sup>9</sup>

Obsession with its inner structure and the way Serbian Progressive Party functions is the crucial part of the opposition’s narrative. Thus the actor Sergej Trifunović finds the relations within SNS utterly morally problematic and degrades Prime Minister Vučić’s associates in terms of their competence and ability to perform a public function. “The biggest problem of Aleksandar Vučić is the fact that he is an intelligent man surrounded by morons. He enjoys being an authority and chooses people that can take it. Unlike his predecessors, he recognizes the existence of the elite; he shies away from it and doesn’t turn to it for help. I have no idea how he would pose an authority if his advisors were people like professor Božović or academician Simović, or any other even slightly intellectually bigger shot. He freed himself from every authority he would have to obey and step back from. On this crossing towards the European way, whatever that means, he created only authority for him, in the figure of Angela Merkel... And what’s worst, it’s not the matter of the rotten state structure anymore, it’s the fact that the rotting is being spread on people too. We are now in a feudal mental state where different servants impose insane taxes to please the Tsar. This Bata Gašić goes around forbidding theatre plays, some big shot decides to cancel Vlado Georgiev’s concert in Smederevo because he wrote on twitter he thought Saša Janković was O.K. (!), and another one blackmails other kids’ parents in a judo club. All hell broke loose. Serbia is ruled by Budža and Radiša, the characters from Domanović’s and Nušić’s works. For a long time now. I am not sure if it was Vučić who called the instructor in Vršac, or the president of the municipality in Smederevo to order them to cancel the concert, or that he at some point threw out the actors from the theater in Zaječar; his servants did this to please him. However, it’s his mistake that he approves of and encourages that way of thinking, acting and behaving. So, we never found out who was ‘the idiot’ from Savamala who sent phantoms in the middle of the night to destroy and we were promised the answer. You pointed a finger at the Minister of the Police whose mistake was obvious and he still won at court? Justice? Police?

9 Srećko Mihailović, „Mi smo izmislili trampizam, pre Trampa [We have invented trumpism before Trump],” *Nedeljnik*, no. 271, p. 22



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We became a nation of slaves and that's the worst! We became a nation of disoriented slaves on a feud."<sup>10</sup>

A particular point of view on internal relations within SNS and relations between Aleksandar Vučić and his associates was also given by the director Puriša Đorđević. The film artist ironically concluded, of course without any raw evidence, that the current Prime Minister despises his associates and furthermore mocks them. "I like the way the kiddo rules, he's highly competent – he opens factories, travels here and there, people greet him and clap their hands and he mocks them..."<sup>11</sup>

Negative image of the government and especially Aleksandar Vučić is in a unique way presented by Slobodan Georgijev, a journalist of *Vreme*, the director of Belgrade's *BIRN*, one among many journalism networks that has been researching the controversial topics in politics and social everyday life. Writing about the pre-election campaign, Georgijev develops a thesis about a radical inequality between the candidates in the presidential race. This inequality stems from the abuse of the public resources inflicted by the government led by SPP, which committed a concrete political "malice" in the name and for the sake of their candidate's victory on the presidential elections. Slobodan Georgijev writes openly and critically about electoral conditions, that is, about the abuse of the state resources in the campaign: "The difference in the behavior of the last 5 years government embodied in the figure of Aleksandar Vučić, the head of the SPP, seems to be in the fact that now everything looks way more helpless, so we find it justified that everything that belongs to the country actually belongs to the ones who lead it and that it poses a place of complete unity. Years back, from the moment when SPP took over the rule in Serbia in the summer of 2012, the government started strengthening their party's private network through the state's institutions: the party's influence on employment, the abuse of power to feed the party's forces were not SPP's invention-they just embraced and reinforced it more aggressively and enthusiastically than their predecessors."<sup>12</sup>

The observations of the *Vreme* journalist fit the image of Vučić as an endemic undemocratic political leader, a man ready to do anything in the name and for the sake of his political victory. At the same time, the saga about unequal electoral conditions represents a preparation for delegitimization of their results provided that they are not according to the expectations and hopes of anti-Vučić coalition.

However, the clearest and, at the same time, paradigmatic form of the radically critical attitude is expressed in an interview with a sociologist, Vesna Pešić. This former politician and an "ever-present" civil activist synthesizes all the "jewels of wisdom" of the Vučić's civil opposition, expressing not only a political confrontation to him, but a kind of a culturally political racism completed by a discourse of curses and libel and shaped by a personal irrationality and an inevitable public immorality. This way she thoroughly and fatally sets an atmosphere of a "spiritual and verbal war" as a determining principle of a public discourse in Serbia. Unhidden indignation, intolerance, pseudo-scientific expressions, boisterous moralism, personal insults towards political opponents illustrate an essential characteristic of this allegedly "enlightened liberally-democratic criticism" of the Vučić's authoritarian governance. It is an allegedly rational transformation into a tabloid style of a harsh political disqualification and accompanying moralistic stigmata that have a deep culturally and politically racist foundation in the media.

10 Sergej Trifunović, "Čvrstoruki knjaz i njegovi dvorjani [The Hard-hearted Knyaz and His Servants]," an interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3451, p. 21

11 Puriša Đorđević, „Vučić se ruga onima koji kliču [Vučić mocks those who acclaim him]," an interview with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 3455, p. 21

12 Slobodan Georgijev, "Danju premijer, noću kandidat [Prime minister at night, presidential candidate during the day]," *Vreme*, no. 1366

In an interview for the weekly *Vreme*, titled as "Zulum of the mobsters in the government" Vesna Pešić offers a coarse estimate of Vučić's political order, his ideological matrix and economic and social practice. But before we emphasize the main points of Vesna Pešić's critical analysis, it is essential to interpret the very title of the interview that illustrates an unquestionable tendency towards tabloidization of the enlightened critical discourse aimed at Vučić's government. The use of the words "zulum" and "mobsters" has a calculated aim, firstly to present the government as something violent and alien to the people it leads, since the term "zulum" refers to a compulsory and cruel tax that Turks mercilessly imposed on Serbs and other oppressed nations during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the word "mobsters" represents a jargoned, colloquial expression referring to criminals, that is, the people on the wrong side of the law. By default, ordinary citizens led by conventional moral, despise and condemn criminals. Thus, from the very beginning it should convince a reader that the government is something monstrous and alien, morally disfigured and politically unacceptable, and encourage anger, active resistance, as well as exploit the reader for "the opposition matters".

Any regards to objectivity and rationality are politically dissolved in the personal interests of the party. A strong term, in this case evoking repulsiveness, is used with an arbitrarily changed descriptive meaning, or more accurately, it is used so as to relate to either temporary or permanent interests of a speaker. Public speech is reduced to a persuasion strategy so the characterization of the political order and its rule goes along with it. The estimate of the "political state of affairs" is dominated by a culturally racist postulate about the radical moral and psychological mental state that characterizes the government. Though the term "radical distortion" dominates the whole interview, it remains unclarified and inexplicit, occupying the key role in the critical fable so thoroughly and boisterously developed by the interviewee: "In accordance with their radical distortion, they imposed an *autocratic nationalism*, the worst exploitation of male and female workers, the complete robbery of the citizens, dramatically weakening the capacity of this society."<sup>13</sup>

Naturally, as the above quoted sociologist states, "repackaged radicals" (the term used by Vesna Pešić to refer to SPP – author's note D.V.S.) destroy everything that represents culture and civilization. The rule of SPP is more than a political problem solvable by a parliamentary system, it is almost a demonic historical force with an immeasurable potential for destruction, a one of a kind amoral political tsunami leading to historical regression, a society and a country that should be observed as the other side of normal. The symbiosis between colloquial pseudo-psychological and political analysis is obvious in the next quote from the interview with Pešić for the opposition's weekly *Vreme*: "Diagnosis is the word, because this has a medical sense. Since leaving socialism behind, Serbia is for the first time lead independently by repackaged radicals. Though we know a lot about their shady business involving great amounts of money with foreign and local tycoons and we see how every corner of the country their people systematically infiltrate, I find everything they do somewhat irritable, fake and immoral. With their *radical mentality* they insult the sanity of people, so the most accurate thing to say is that they are more of a pathological than a political phenomenon. We live in the state of emergency that is the result of a constant sick obsession with the governance of a man who will take no boundaries. His imagination and reason are twisted, resembling nothing but radicals. Some say we shouldn't be tricked by the 'illness' since it is, as everything else, illusory. All right, that's a lie as well, but the fact that he lies with such premeditation and *skill*, constantly inventing different events with his many faces, only encourages the feeling that we live in an abnormal setting. The purpose of that setting is destruction of the civilized, common and normal every-day life of people and institutions. Of course I know that Serbia has never

13 Vesna Pešić, "Zulum krimosa na vlasti [Zulum of the mobsters in the government]," a talk with Tatjana Taigrov, *Vreme*, no. 1361, p. 16

been more narrow-minded than these days, radicals are masters of the craft when it comes to insulting people's intelligence."<sup>14</sup>

Despite the fact that none of the opposition political parties have been banned, nor their activists have been persecuted or arrested without legal basis, Vesna Pešić keeps insisting on the destruction of the political life committed by SPP and led by Aleksandar Vučić. "For them 5th October is a state coup, a counter-revolution that violently took off power from radicals and Milošević. Instead of those amazing people, DOS came, more dangerous than Huns and Avars together! Everything that happened during the 5th October rule should be liquidated and forgotten because those crooks destroyed Serbia... Those were all mere thieves, corrupt politicians and tycoons that impoverished people and sold Serbia. They presented themselves as the God-given saviors, honorable and hard-working people, who did not steal and whose only goal was the well-being of Serbia and its people. As it were they don't know what private and personal interest is. So the biggest of all lies was swollen, because it was repeated on every occasion in every place! The truth is quite the opposite form the radicals' story. The very same radicals led by Milošević destroyed Serbia to the core during the 90's. The lie was supposed to wash away the biographies of the radicals and turn them into repentant saints, while the democratic and every other kind of opposition were supposed to be wiped out. The opposition dispersed under all that pressure and their own frivolity. The poor part of Serbia that belonged to the radicals accepted the lie, though they could have seen that far the professional deceivers that radicals are."<sup>15</sup>

The survival of Vučić as the ruler is not only the consequence of the oppositions lack of power and the lack of interest of a certain part of the electorate to actively participate, but it is also a product of the silent agreement between the opposition and the European Union. This idea is very explicitly emphasized by Vesna Pešić who does not hide her dismay with such a flow of events: "They've turned the blind eye for two reasons. They have their own problems and no strength to fight the stagnant nationalist societies and the evil spirits of the Balkans. Secondly, it seems to me that they signed Serbia off, as they say – let Russia take over if they want, we won't enter European Union any sooner. All the west Balkans countries are more or less left to themselves. The dialogues about Kosovo are so as to create an impression that the EU does something. Just to remind you, when you become politically poor they jump at an autocrat to do them favors and gurantee peace (it doesn't matter and they don't care what they say about the 'internal use'), at least there will be no war, and they don't have an alternative. That's why it is so important for Vučić that there is no alternative and no opposition, so that the big guys wouldn't put him off."<sup>16</sup>

The complete semantic and huge rethorical overlap between the activist sociologist Vesna Pešić and the presidential candidate of the opposition Vuk Jeremić is evident when it comes to the relation between the EU and Vučić. Both, Jeremić and Vesna Pešić are nostalgic about the "good old days" when their option was a political favorite of the West: "The relation of the West towards Serbia resembles the famous Chruhill's question to his associates when they warned him that he would create a communist Yugoslavia if he supported Tito in the Second World War. He asked 'Are you going to live in that country?' When they said no, he told them that the only thing they should pay attention to was who killed more Germans. Unfortunately, the West regards Serbia in a similar way. Vučić is striving to create an autocratic society which is not according to their standards, but since they are not planning to live here, they tap him on the back and let him repress the people, turning the blind eye at his outrageousness. In return,

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 18

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 19

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 19



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they get favours, firstly in the Brussels dialogue, but also in many other fields.<sup>17</sup>

Another point of overlap in the discourse between a liberal activist Vesna Pešić and a mild nationalist Vuk Jeremić is in the way they identify the current state of affairs in the society with “the abnormal”. The presidential candidate Vuk Jeremić gave this statement regarding the polemic with the political opponents from Serbian Progressive Party: „A lot of disinformation that is being given is pretty much contradictory. All of them have one purpose-an attempt to defame and discredit me in every way, but lets see how it affects the election results. I’ve got an impression that this time, especially in my case-allow me a dose of subjectivity-they crossed the line of what’s normal. The best example of it is the public statement given by the ruling party under the sign of the candidate Aleksandar Vučić, that my wife is the head of the most powerful narco-cartel in Serbia.”<sup>18</sup>

Though the stigmatization of the Jeremić’s wife is a morally inappropriate move even for the high level of negative campaign present in Serbia, as well as for modern democracy, Jeremić naturally misses the opportunity to spot that in the mentioned interview he also displayed a great deal of unproven accusations against the Prime Minister Vučić. The mentioned accusations serve as special political and media constants in the very core of the political discourse of the opposition. The same way Jeremić zealously reproduces these and discloses them without hesitation: “I think that a country has never been in a such firm embrace with an organized crime, especially certain parts of Serbia such as Vojvodina and northern Kosovo. You cannot have a serious entrepreneurial activity unless you’re given a green light, that is, unless you paid protection racket to certain territorially organized people, a number of which belongs under the sphere of influence of Andrej Vučić, the Prime Minister’s brother. Of course he is the most powerful one, but there are others too. One of them is Nikola Petrović, The Prime Minister’s close associate and bestman, and the another is Beba Popović, the mover and shaker of the media in Serbia.”<sup>19</sup>

Apart from the accusations that he is an authoritarian surrounded by personnel he despises and “morally questionable” or, more precisely, controversial people, Aleksandar Vučić is described as an ideologically undefined persona, an unprincipled Machiavellian whose politics entirely depends on the current mood of public opinion. Special attention is given to Vučić’s “undefined” politics in the next excerpt from Zoran Paunović’s column: “Šešelj can be a part of Vučić’s mambo jambo government and supporters, but Vučić wouldn’t be as innocuous if he went back to any of the political fathers’ <original principles>, be it Šešelj’s radical <original principles> (that are still in use) or Nikolić’s progressive ‘original principles’ that are not valid any more. The latter are not valid since it is still undefined what those really are. Similarly, Vučić’s principledness is a very questionable (Machiavellian) category, especially in a situation where the crucial ideologists of the Vučić’s projected historical position and balance in this monotheistic universe are not Sonja Liht, Željko Cvijanović, Nikola Samardžić or Dragomir Anđelković, but most likely Srđan Bogosavljević (the director of Ipsos Strategic Marketing in Serbia – author’s note D.V.S.)”<sup>20</sup>

As an “ideologically undefined authoritarian”, by the unanimous opinion of his critics, Aleksandar Vučić fatally opposes any kind of freedom of media, that is acceptance of the critical model of journalistic reporting. Vučić is exclusively interested in propaganda and strengthening of his own politics, while dismissing the opposition by means of the media under his control. Control over the media provides

17 Vuk Jeremić, “Oni vas gaze dok ne pokažete zube [They pick on you until you put your foot down],” an interview with Veljko Lalić and Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, no. 268, p. 42

18 Vuk Jeremić, “Prešli su sve granice normalnosti [They’ve crossed behind the line of the normal],” an interview with Momir Turudić, *Vreme*, br. 1368, p. 13

19 Ibid, p. 12

20 Zoran Panović, “Nove i stare demokrate [New and old democrats],” *Nedeljnik*, no. 268, p. 30

an unquestionable advantage for Vučić’s propaganda over that of any other political candidate. This constellation came to be especially due to electronic media, the most powerful one, whereas the other ways of informing are either free of the government’s pressure or left on their own under the cruel laws of the market.

The lack of control over the work of electronic media during the election campaign is a deliberate “malice” of the government with the aim to retain their dominance in the electronic media: “Thanks to a free interpretation of law and poorly formed explanations, regulatory agency of the electronic media this year does not supervise the behavior of the emitters in the election campaign. Since in the meantime National Assembly of Serbia did not form a supervisory committee that would be in charge of the proceedings of the political parties and candidates, as well as the media reporting in the campaign, at this point there is no any public or official control of what’s going on in the ether. In that sense – without an institutional control of the media in the pre-election campaign, without a state body that would supervise the parties’ behavior in the absolute dictatorship of the media- even now it is clear that it is not possible and there will be no free democratic elections in Serbia in 2017.”<sup>21</sup>

The working assumption behind the claims about a systematically created chaos, that is, the lack of effective regulators in the media which enables an intensive discourse of insults and libel in public, is to blame it on Aleksandar Vučić. In the presidential campaign, Vučić’s allegedly intolerant and repressive attitude towards the media is often insisted on, as well as the premeditated creation of the system wherein tabloidization not only of the media, but the society and the country too, takes place. This idea is especially emphasized by the new president of NUNS (Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia) Slaviša Lekić: “The media system in Serbia as it is, is one of the most irresponsible entities of this society, and the political arena as it is, is a phenomenal climate for ‘scandal sheets’ that are so extremely cruel in stigmatization that they manage to startle even myself, and it’s not easy to do so. Look, it’s not that only in Serbia we have such a strong tabloid culture that promotes gossips, rumours, affairs and scandals. However, nowhere else as in Serbia do we have such an almost perfect concept of media lynch and disfiguring of the people whose opinion differs from that of the ruling nomenclature. It is not about the race for sensation and profit anymore: behind almost every story in those tabloid trash bins there is a political background. One of these days I expect to find a knife as a gift in a copy of that trash instead of the photos of different saints. It doesn’t matter if it’s plastic, it would take longer to slit a throat anyway. It is not about tabloidization of the media any more, it is about tabloidization of Serbia which overcomes the influence of the media and journalist associations, that kind of ‘media’ does not react to collegial criticism, they are not obliged by the attitudes of Press Council, they ignore judicial proceedings. It’s time for the country to act, starting with a tax on that trash. But how to do so, when they are encouraged by the very country!”<sup>22</sup>

What goes along with the tabloidization of the country is the absence of debates as a part of media political content expected in democracy. Political intolerance of the government, especially its first man, makes room for aggressive models of communication with political opponents and electorate, as noticed by professor doctor Snježana Milivojević: “The absence of debate programs overwhelmed our culture and in general the possibility to discuss different ideas in the same public space. Since 2000, this society has been struggling to find the forms in which such public discussion can be led. Currently in the government we have a group that grew up during the 90’s and who is very unfavorable towards democracy and liberal ideas. Not only that their governance is autocratic, but their political taste is extremely

21 Tamara Skrozza, „Bahatost, laži i divlji programi [Arrogance, lies and wild programs],” *Vreme*, no. 1368

22 Slaviša Lekić, „Protiv straha se ne bori u četiri zida [You don’t fight fear between four walls],” *Vreme*, no. 1369

exclusive and intolerant. They completely close the space for any other voice to be heard between the media and the parliament but their own. Even if there was a talk, as you said previously, everything is false, their facts are false, their truth is false.”

Life in the world of false facts, as described by professor Milivojević, eradicates the spirit of a justified scepticism and argued discussion while enabling Aleksandar Vučić to develop his optimistic fables. The way Dragoljub Žarković sees it, when it comes to his relationship to the media, Vučić is a combination of an intolerant and aggressive politician and a phantasmic illusionist: “Instead of justified scepticism and serious discussion, our main aspirant to the absolute power spreads boisterous optimism and avoids any conversation wherein he could be faced with the facts. That’s the flow the campaign in which Vučić is competing against himself in making up a story of a better life.”<sup>23</sup>

Taking into consideration the “critical module” analyzed on the previous pages, it imposes as “logical” the politically apocalyptic conclusion given by the professor at the Faculty of Political Science and the opposition’s member, Dušan Pavlović. Analyzing the possibility of victory, fanatically in the anti-Vučić mode, though a former member of Aleksandar Vučić’s administration when minister of justice was the leader of DBJ Saša Radulović, Pavlović explicitly states: “In that case we are about to enter 5 years of darkness. Serbia is dramatically going under in a sense of democratic values, the rule of law is jeopardized, the freedom of media is in a horrible condition and we are falling to the bottom of the lists that comparatively measure the success of democracy in the world. With Vučić we will face a further downfall of democracy and my intention to prevent that from happening was the reason why I became politically engaged.”<sup>24</sup>

Reporting of Serbian weeklies about government, or more precisely about Aleksandar Vučić, during the presidential elections campaign was no different from their previous work. Aleksandar Vučić was presented as an extremely negative political persona. “Anti-democratic and liberally inclined”, “a ruler that uses demagoguery and manipulates with fear”, “in favour of different opinion”, “closed for any kind of democratic discussion”, “a politician whose favours to the West when it comes to Kosovo and regional politics are rewarded by a silent approval to his implementation of a ‘soft dictatorship’ that is often characterized by totalitarian elements”, “a creator of deeply criminalized clientele that uses public resources in order to keep the power”. Presented in this way, it is understandable that Vučić was not given even an inch of space in the printed weeklies to present and argue his presidential agenda. As the previous campaign illustrates, between Vučić and the critical public there is an insurmountable and definite, almost fatal gap.

#### **Opposition’s image in the presidential campaign- morally, politically and patriotically controversial, necessary, on the difficult road to political recovery**

The image of the opposing candidates in the presidential campaign in weekly newspaper and editorial columns has been shown as complex and in many different shapes. With daily and weekly newspaper, such as *Informer* and *Pečat* which are severely critical towards the “5<sup>th</sup> October” winners, the image of the euro reformative opposing presidential candidates such as Jeremić’s and Janković’s has been

23 Dragoljub Žarković, “Hod po tankom ledu- Vučić u totalnoj kampanji, koga zavaravamo kad govorimo o ekonomskoj stabilnosti i šta su vikali pod prozorom profesora Slobodana Antonića [Walk on a thin ice-Vučić totally in the campaign, who are we fooling when we’re talking about economic stability and what was shouted at the window of professor Slobodan Antonić]”, *Vreme*, no. 1366, p. 6

24 Dušan Pavlović, “Dobri su nam i Jeremić i Janković [Both Jeremić and Janković are good for us]”, a talk with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 1366, p. 12

presented as negative. In the media mentioned above, besides the two interviews with the representatives of Democratic Serbian Party (DSP) during the presidential campaign, there were no interviews with members of the euro reformative opposition while a small space was left open for the anti-European opposition directed to Vučić and led by Dveri and DSP presidential candidates. The two mentioned interviews were the only form of the presidential candidate and political party introduction.

Šešelj and Serbian Radical Party (SRS) don’t share the same status but definitely cannot be and are not the preferences of these media, although the radicals aren’t politically stigmatized unlike the “October 5<sup>th</sup>” winners. The opposition image is presented as severely negative on all political issues including the opponents political credibility and any other issue, reminding us of time when they had the power or by discussing and questioning their previous attitudes, together with their straight forward or intentions in disguise.

On the other hand, weekly paper such as *Vreme*, *NIN*, *Novi magazin* and *Nedeljnik* provide direct support that doesn’t vary according to the content but according to the intensity. With weeklies that pursue the critical review, the intensity of support to the opposition is stronger and is not only measured with open space for the attitudes and interpretation of the opponents, but also with the radical strength of the campaign negativity lead against Aleksandar Vučić and SRP.

Unlike *Informer* and *Pečat*, opposition leaders are provided with enormous space for defining and presenting their attitudes, which leads to political, and media closure of argumentation and rhetorical influence of the power. This influences the meager audience of weeklies and narrows the influence of power towards the capillary public. This type of media-political constellation merely results in conflict between Vučić and “the elite”.

The opposition’s image complexity reflects in different approaches to the issue of its operation and potential. Pro-Government weekly media such as *Informer* and somewhat *Pečat* see its influence and potentials as controversial. Simultaneously, the opposition weeklies, especially the ones radically critical towards the regime such as *Vreme* and *NIN* often conclude the Public Opinion and political impotence and also develop discourses which show democratic system deficiency occasionally empowering its influence. What was found as striking is that the details in these weeklies do not consist of any critical approach towards the euro reformative opposition dating from the time of their leading regime, which was not long ago. This type of “oblivion” behavior is not occasional but deliberately and sensibly chosen having in mind that the critical weeklies are the active factors in political controversies and a sort of an intellectual supplement in this exhausting battle between political officials in Serbia.

The forming of presidential candidates negative image went to many different directions, which were interrelated and made a sensible propaganda. However, prior to this conclusion, it should be emphasized that the sharp edge of criticism coming from opponents’ critics, was mostly pointed towards Vuk Jeremić and Sasa Jankovic who were the electorates and politically strongest competition against Aleksandar Vučić.

The rejection of opposing candidates caught its dynamic unity at one point: the rejection of their competencies- having insight into their results from the time when their parties were the power, the rejection of moral credibility, the rejection of the public support extent, the rejection of their attitudes towards democracy and the rejection of patriotism.

In contribution to the negative component of the opponents and their parties, the weekly *Informer* had its sharp leading role both in the regular political articles and editorial columns by Dragan J. Vučićević.

His columns question the opponents' moral-political sense and critically review the opposition media together with NGOs with special emphasis on the "October 5<sup>th</sup>" winners. Basic thesis of these thesis could be summarized in three interrelated points that clarify the author's approach: 1) Present opposition and their candidates do not have moral credibility (because of the corrupt officials they contain) and political capacity to lead the country because of transition failure in Serbia, 2) among media that argues against the opposition, which is the majority, the present Government is being attacked without any serious nor rational justification and with only one aim – to overthrow it, 3) there is an undoubted discrimination in the present opponent supporting media against all the others who are not directly against Vučić's regime.

Vučičević's criticism is directed towards the opposition together with their candidates as political stage factors and media, which are utterly critical towards the present regime. His criticism is *ad hominem*, sharply personalized, in order to be more convincing. That's the reason why a certain individual is being stigmatized with its morally psychological profile being sketched in order for the person to be presented as an unworthy to perform any type of function in public life. This type of approach has a special influence in the presidential campaign which is strictly personalized by its nature, whereas the citizens are to determinate the certain individual who is to present a certain political option and due diligence.

In order to comprehend the media-political stage in Serbia, the columns of the editor-in-chief of *Informer* are relevant for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, he uses the writing style and the content of messages from his articles that are clear to the lower educated class who mostly buys those types of weeklies and are loyal voters during the elections. Secondly, on daily and weekly basis, *Informer* questions the negative attitudes and media-political images produced by media, which is critically oriented towards the present Government, which is why it is relevant. Lastly *Informer* is the leading paper in daily issue area and it creates a negative image of the present opposition as the political factor.

One of the starting points of Vučićević's columns is that the concept of political opposition is not strictly related to the political parties which, in the Parliament, vote against the Government's political decisions, laws and other types of proposals and initiatives, but is a network of related organizations and public figures. The main focus is party committees, NGOs, media, public intellectuals. The other assumption is the specific comprehension of politics, which Vučićević assigns to the opposing leaders and their media allies. Politics is for the opposing leaders, and as Vučićević describes, an instrument for the enrichment of the past political elite. In the conditions of high poverty and poor life opportunities, this type of cognition is the fuel for the present Government campaign and media related to it. These types of campaigns produce anger, disappointment or indifferent behavior with the opponents but at the same time can motivate the voters to prevent the restoration of the political elite composed of "October 5<sup>th</sup>" winners.

The third assumption that Vučićević pointed out is the opposition's patriotism insufficiency, anti-Russian attitude and unquestionable loyalty towards the Western power. According to Vučićević, in order to win and rise to power, the opposition is capable of doing anything necessary at that moment, from creating media campaigns to performing the actions that are to destabilize Serbia as a country.

Within the saga about loyalty towards the Western power, two interrelated points vary: absence of national-political responsibility coherence of any kind and distance from Russia, which is Serbia's ally and always has been.

A few issued examples from *Informer* present an anti-opposition discourse related to the points men-

tioned above. Extensive definition of the opposition and its contextualization of quarrels between political parties, whether it is about parties themselves or other actual or potential rivals, defining politics as a personal enrichment instrument, heavy accusations which contradict the basic norms of politeness, exclusivity in moral judgment, personal and moral questioning of each opponent, all these discourse elements are joined in a strong unity which is to leave a mark in the head of the target readers and continually influence their political judgment.

From the content perspective, Vučićević's columns contain interrelated elements, which contextualize political figures, events and processes. The opposition was given a negative role. Firstly it is not democratic because it strives for "power without choice", followed by being "the factor of political instability", the potential "public violence like Macedonia, Ukraine etc." generator, it has "a suspicious patriotic orientation", moral imperfection of the opposing leaders is doubtless and radical, treats Serbia as "West colony or a vassal", is financially supported by Rockefeller funds and American billionaire of Hungarian heritage George Soros's money... Simultaneously, the chief-in-editor's columns explicitly support the aspects of Aleksandar Vučić's political program and his Government's influence, whether it tackles the foreign policy course between the East and West or a political coverage of campaign against crime and corruption. It is obvious that Vučićević's sharply polemic columns are pointed at the opposition media, that is to say media that is both critically sensitized towards the power or is openly critical towards Russia. The whole issue, approach, rhetorically argumentative plots and conclusions are framed with the moral panic atmosphere and high extent of tension on a micro, micro, even global level.

Political contradictions between specific individuals, points of view together with rivalry of great power holders on local and worldwide level, are presented in a fatally tense manner with a dose of subjective passion and categorist approach in conclusion. The first point in creating the negative opposition image is the argument that the opposition doesn't present the authentic-political alternative but a production of "interest" coalition of foreign, primarily Western, emphasized American factor of domestic tycoons and politicians who work for the personal and the interest of the moral-problematic groups mentioned above. The following definition of the opposition is given by Dragan J. Vučićević: "Whether you like it or not, in the country which is becoming more serious by day, the ones who would like to restore it to the state DOS playground won't regret millions of euros in attempt to cause chaos. Domestic tycoons whose interest is not for "brotherly deals" and easy money by robbing the state budget to evaporate, together with EU-NATO criminals who hanker to bring back the time when Serbia was being commanded by pressing 'the Brussels button', will perform these elections with 'all or nothing' strategy."<sup>25</sup>

Special place in the definition of opposition takes place in the presentation of thesis about cultural-political racism, which is directly or indirectly related to the manner in which the opposition leaders and critical part of the public treats the present regime and its members. This matrix, in the opposition's evaluation and analysis process, assigns different usually two roles, to the political figures, their voters and supporters. The members of the European-citizen opposition are perceived as open minded, progressive, emancipated, Europe and acculturation-oriented hence intellectually and morally extraordinary. On the other hand, the political regime leaders, primarily Aleksandar Vučić, are marked as anti-democrat, fake Europeans, morally and intellectually immature and unequal. In one word, there are two Serbias: one is morally and intellectually high and the other is low. One is European and civil and the other is primitive and strongly anti-European. It is to say that this definition in the opinion and evaluation of reality by the civil elite, has undertaken severe criticism. Previously quoted Dragan J. Vučićević said: "Yellow (referring to the color of Democratic Party)-scum elite is again trying to intrude with caste divisions.

25 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Priljava, najpriljavije [Dirty, dirtier]“, *Informer*, 21. 01. 2017, p. 7

The campaign video created with a stolen idea from Obama’s campaign, is to impose the conclusion to the Public Opinion that the Serbian elite almost unanimously supports Janković and that the ones who dare to support Aleksandar Vučić are mercenaries, bots, accept bribes in form of a sandwich and are the lowest caste that should not interfere with the future of this country. Let’s see who is teaching us about respect and political moral in his video. Let’s ask ourselves, how is it possible that ex singer and now careerist drunken Vlado Georgiev is speaking to us about agriculture? When and where has he ever been a figure in agriculture? Only if we count the brotherly-tycoon combinations on the account of his private company?! And how is it possible that Tanja Vojtehovski is teaching us about freedom and independence in the ‘Gun slinger’s’ video? Let me remind you, Tanja is the ‘journalist’ who asked a victim of a terrible family violence, in her talk show, if she came while her father was raping her?! And how did we get to a point where Trifunović brothers, Sergej and Branislav are teaching us about survival? Maybe they were thinking of survival under the influence of narcotics? The whole city of Belgrade knows that they are the experts in that area... The presidential elections on April 2<sup>nd</sup>, are the last good opportunity for the DOS Yellow-scum elite to mount again, lie, cheat and steal without consequences. And that’s why, for the next three weeks, they will perform the dirtiest possible campaign. And that’s why, in the night of elections, they will try to cause bloody conflicts. Think about it.”<sup>26</sup>

To prove that this approach is the generator of division, the columnist of *Večernje novosti* Ranko Dmitrović, will confirm by saying that the tendencies towards hypostatizing the moral and political pretentious attitude of the opposition, he perceives as the Adler conception of a more complex value. It is about deep structure in the opinion and action which has been applied for over twenty years. Exclusivity and division, the inherent opposition discourse, cause outrage and judgment of Ratko Dmitrović: “That hypocrisy is not a newborn – it stinks throughout Serbia for decades – and is not the reason for these lines. It is about civil and political elitism, the disparagement of anyone who thinks differently. That continuous pattern in Serbian politics was born on the same day when the multi partying and will never be exterminated. This phenomenon is based on exclusivity, superiority above others and a more complex value. Alfred Adler’s patients, based on Serbian recipe”.

In the same vein, Nikola Vrzić sends an almost identical, somewhat indirect message also. In his article written after the political rally held in Novi Sad he writes: “Scarcely any time was needed last Saturday for the photographs of the toothless supporters of Serbian Progressive Party to explode over the local, and yet endless, internet space, who, with the implied and understandable trouble, but still eagerly due to their hunger, nibble on received sandwiches and enthusiastically greet their presidential candidate Aleksandar Vučić.”

“Toothless sandwich-munchers from the rally in Novi Sad organized by Vučić were momentarily treated with a thorough mocking on social networks, frequented by people who consider themselves to be above the aforementioned group, and the rally supporters were spared serious emotional pain only by the fact that social networks that welcome them do not belong to the cyber space, but to the markets, bazaars and pubs, when, from time to time, they receive a paycheck. In any case, this ephemeral episode from Novi Sad demonstrated the mentioned toothless group of losers on one side, and the others so sure that they are better and have the right to judge them, further supported in such a belief by celebrities. It sounds familiar because it is. Hillary Clinton also surrounded herself with celebrities and people thinking that they are better for despising the American losers, losers of a transition over there known as globalization, which comes down to the same thing, and we all know how that ended when the people spoke up. And this did not only happen in America, it is happening in the rest of the world also, the world

26 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Lažna elita [False elite],“ *Informer*, 11. 03. 2017, p. 5



Pečat, 17th March 2017

of Western neoliberal democracy. It is a global trend, the self-proclaimed elitists and their celebrities are fading into history more and more."<sup>27</sup>

Aside from being deeply immersed in narcissism and political and moral exclusivity, anti-European and urban political elite is burdened by corruption and a high degree of incapability to do anything meaningful for the common good, or more precisely, the state. For that reason, this opposition is deeply amoral.

This is concisely demonstrated by the following quote from the article of the editor in chief of *Večernje novosti*, Ratko Dmitrović: „The bottom line of the transition conducted by the political parties of the current opposition – the political credibility is undermined by emphasizing the incompetence. The thesis is that the length of their stay in power is in direct opposition to their positive impact. Lost time – ineffectual politics. Did they establish the borders of Serbia, consolidated the state, kept it whole, revived the economy, built roads, stopped the downslide of Serbian villages... Set an example for others? Where are their factories, their production lines? What did they put on the domestic and foreign market, except for lies and deceptions? They sold everything that had a price tag. They destroyed (consciously, brutally, criminally) four key Serbian banks, with ties to the whole Serbian industry. Without that step, they could not have moved to the destruction of that same industry, into pillaging and doom they named privatization. How did they contribute to the Serbian culture, these same people that today mention lustration? Padlocks (long since rusted) on the National Museum, Museum of Modern Art, until recently even on the Museum of City of Belgrade. Does anyone think that this is an accident? We are the only European state where a tourist cannot enter a museum that would give him some idea about the culture of the people whose name the said state carries. They gave pens with living pigs (Yorkshire breed) to the October Salon. That is the peak of their contribution, of their culture. They filled the famous galleries with garbage or turned them into ‘anti-war’ oasis where Serbs were presented as murderers, monsters, rapists, and a genocidal waste – claiming it to be culture. All that comes from their mouths are anguished cries for the freedom of the press, and during their reign they passed a law that was and never will be seen in Europe. Because of the disgrace. Which quality, free and popular newspaper was their creation? Which television? If only they had any shame.”

In the same manner as being morally challenged and essentially incompetent in leading the state, the opposition is also disinclined, or more precisely, completely hermetic to the solution of the national question. Meek patriotism should be understood as the most personal choice of that political elite, which is not only anti-national, but in essence has no grasp of the (geo)political game both in the region and the world. Lack of national interest implies the lack of politically articulated skepticism towards Europe and intensive Russophobia. All of the three mentioned moments present in opposition campaigns are evidenced by the editor in chief of *Pečat*, Milorad Vučelić: “Looking at the presidential elections, even with our best effort to discover some topic important for the state or the nation which would be pressed by the opposition candidates, we find it an almost impossible task. It is very difficult, even impossible, to see some meaning in these events. Difficulty even arises in trying to elevate problems to the level of serious criticism. There is no response or even an attempt of a comment on the problems caused by great changes happening in both the world and Europe. No one comments the state in Macedonia, or the disruption caused by the foreign factor in that state. No one even thinks about offering a comment and any solution to the newly incoming immigrant waves talked about openly between Erdogan and Germany. And those waves must go through Serbia. The democratic opposition candidates do not even think about achieving a victory or significant results in the first electoral round, but dream only of a chance to unite in the second round and try to accomplish something. Vučić is meeting Putin in the following days.

27 Nikola Vrzić, “Vrednosti i sendviči [Values and Sandwiches],” *Pečat*, no. 463, p. 6

This will present an excellent opportunity for the democratic opposition to reach for Russophobia as a campaign argument. It is the turf where they, unlike the rest of the nation, feel right at home.”<sup>28</sup>

As nationally insensitive, politically irresponsible and only motivated by the desire for power, the opposition is represented as a political actor that will try literally everything, even the destabilization of the political system and the society in general, in the case of defeat on presidential elections. This kind of characterization of the opposition as a political actor is parallel with the overview of state in the neighboring Macedonia, where the state has been institutionally ‘paralyzed’ and brought to the brink of dramatic political confrontations. In Macedonia, the stake in the confrontation between political elites is not their succession, but the survival of the state itself. To the opposition, which is not nationally sensitive, or politically responsible towards the state, the governing motivation is the desire for power: “Their only chance to achieve this is to divide us and make us fight each other, in order to use the Serbs to their benefit. The aforementioned Macedonia is the demonstrative example of such an operation. The country that has almost 80 percent of Macedonian population was brought by the actions of NATO democracy in the situation where its collective fate, life and death, war and peace is decided by 19 percent of Albanians. There is a similar plan for Serbia. With the only difference being that the role of the Albanians will here be given to NATO presidential candidates Vuk ‘Pozderac’ Jeremić, Saša ‘the Gun Singer’ Janković, Boško ‘the Wuss’ Obradović and Crazy Radule. The idea is that on the evening of 2<sup>nd</sup> of April the biggest news is not who won the most votes, but who cracked the most heads! Whatever the results of the presidential elections, whatever happens at the voting ballots, the NATO candidates will declare ‘grand electoral theft’ in the night between 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> of April, accuse Vučić of being the greatest dictator of all times and try to cause a political revolution in Serbia according to the scenarios already seen in Skopje, Bucharest and Kiev... They will, of course, have the support of the democratic tabloid scum elite, Scott and the rest of the bastards from the troupes of foreign ambassadors in Belgrade. Of course, if the NATO villains will succeed in their villainous intentions, is dependent entirely upon us. It is dependent upon our collective intelligence. If we believe, in majority, that any happiness for us and our children can be obtained by NATO Vuk, Sale the Gun Slinger, Boško the Wuss or Crazy Radule, then we do not deserve better fate than the unfortunate Macedonia.”<sup>29</sup>

Next to the parallel with the Macedonian scenario, there is also the parallel between the opposition and the hated Albanians, known by their pejorative nickname “Shqiptars”. Through this image the rage against the opposition is intensified and one of the key moments in the creation of the negative image of the opposition is established. The opposition is something worst in the vocabulary and consciousness of the average citizen.

The mentioned message, more precisely the relation ‘opposition-Shqiptars’, is to be repeated until it is impressed upon the mind of every average voter. Apart from the moral stigmatization of oppositional politicians, the recipe for building their negative image is the insistence on their political inconsistency, or, more precisely, a fatal discrepancy between their words and actions. Their declarative struggle for democratic values is opposite to the concrete politics of oppositional leaders. One of the prominent examples is the protest of the supporters of the oppositional presidential candidate Vuk Jeremić outside the premises of the daily newspaper *Informer*. On this rally a person from the criminal underground was noticed, a soldier from the violent and criminal special unit “Crvene beretke”. The convicted former Special Forces police officer was shown as a threat to the *Informer*, and a threat to Serbia in case there was a change in power.

28 Milorad Vučelić, “Najveća tajna [The Greatest Secret],” *Pečat*, no. 463, p.

29 Dragan J. Vučićević, „Lekcija Skoplje [Lesson Skopje],” *Informer*, 04. 03. 2017, p. 7

The intention of suggestive exaggeration with the goal of politically discrediting the oppositional candidate is evidenced by the following quote from the article by editor in chief of the daily newspaper *Informer*, Dragan J. Vučićević: "It is good, surely, that the Serbian people see as soon as possible what kind of a person and fascist Vuk Pozderac Buljubašić Jeremić really is. It is very important that the mentioned little leader, who likes to falsely represent himself as the 'former world president', showed his true face in this electoral campaign. And that is the face of a monster. A monster who, if he ever got into power, would make the darkest personal tyranny out of Serbia. A monster that would ban and lynch everyone who would dare to publicly think and speak different from him. A monster that, for the sake of his own behind and interests, does not shy away from a pact with the blackest of devils. A monster that declares himself as one of the closest associates of the murdered Zoran Đinđić, but takes into his fold Legija's assassins!?! And we should remember – the campaign of the effendi Jeremić did one more great thing for all of us. It has, namely, completely uncovered the grotesque essence of the large part of Serbian media that is still under control of the democratic scum elite. If you do not understand, ask yourselves if the Belgrade media would almost completely ignore the scenario where the questionable journalists are physically prevented from attending the press conference if this was done by Vučić? Or, if all media would be conspiratorially silent if Vučić hired a convicted assassin from Legija's paramilitary unit?! Finally, what is your opinion, would the democratic political commissars on the national television ignore the news that, by some case, it was proven that the bank account of Aleksandar Vučić was financed with 7.5 million dollars of unknown origins during three and a half years?! Think about all of this."<sup>30</sup>

Next to the negative value connotation that was systematically and with great detail ascribed to the oppositional presidential candidates, overview of the opposition in the anti-regime media was significantly different. Firstly, as the numerous quotes have shown, anti-government weeklies opened up enormous space for the political messages of the opposition leaders. Their interpretation of the actors, events and processes in Serbia dominated almost all of the weeklies, including the weekly newspaper *Pečat* who gave significant amount of space to the leaders of DSS, Aleksandar Popović, the party's presidential candidate on the elections and Miloš Jovanović, the leader of this parliamentary right wing and Euro skeptical party. Apart from the messages calling for the voting against the hated regime of Aleksandar Vučić, great number of opposition leaders delved into calculations on raising the number of voters and projecting the positive media and political strategy to push the elections into the second round. This strategy had a motivationally political character. The opposition needed to be represented as a worthy opponent to the current government, and the various convincing techniques, one of which was the statistics derived from surveying the public, were meant to rouse the passive electoral body to anti-Vučić side.

There are two obvious examples that confirm the active presence of the aforementioned strategies beyond any doubt. The front page of the weekly *Nedeljnik* on which the oppositional presidential candidate Vuk Jeremić sends message to the leader of SPP and the presidential candidate of the ruling coalition Aleksandar Vučić "After the elections Vučić will be the opposition leader... Voter activity is very important, but what is most important is how the oppositional candidates will treat each other in the coming weeks. If more than 50 percent of people in this country think that their lives are good or bad – that is the only estimate... I am convinced that there is a far greater number of those that are unsatisfied, and with reasons, and so our most important goal should be to encourage them to vote and in that way express their opinion towards the circumstances of our lives."<sup>31</sup>

30 Dragan J. Vučićević, "Hvala Jeremiću [Thank you, Jeremić]," *Informer*, 25. 03. 2017, p. 4

31 Vuk Jeremić, "Oni vas gaze dok ne pokažete zube [They will step on you until you show some teeth]," conversation with Veljko Lalić i Nenad Čaluković, *Nedeljnik*, no. 268, p. 38

Parallel with the motivation for protest voting, degradation of the rating of Aleksandar Vučić is in place. That rhetorical maneuver has the goal of tearing down the myth of the 'invincibility' of Vučić. In the course of this political and propaganda activity statistics from unnamed agencies are used, which are presented as having the absolute precision in measuring popularity and prediction of electoral results. Example of the 'numbers' game is the aforementioned interview of the DJB parliament member, dr Dušan Pavlović: "It is my opinion that the support for Aleksandar Vučić and SPP is seriously lower than what is served through the surveys of the public. Secondly, the elections are staged. He does not have that much support..."<sup>32</sup>

The euphoric combination of the negative obsession with Vučić and 'pumping' personal oppositional confidence culminates in Pavlović's "inspired overview of the difference between the 'false' and 'real' statistical data that reflect the state of the electoral body. This overview includes the possibility of early parliamentary elections: "A man thinks in one way when he believes that he has 40 or 45 percent, and in a different way when he finds out that he has 30 percent support. Or when he hears that his opponent, DBJ, which had 6-7 percent, today has 15 percent support. I think that, after this new information, he is not so in the mood for parliamentary elections any more, 30 percent support is a serious problem for him."<sup>33</sup>

Motivation of passive voters along with the degradation of Aleksandar Vučić's rating culminates in the dramatization of the potential outcome. In that context, the possibility of the second electoral round is legitimized, in spite of mathematical and political circumstances that made the second round only a theoretical possibility. However, placing hope in greater number of active voters which creates the possibility for the second round goes through the mind of the opposition parliament member, public surveyor and political analyst, Đorđe Vukadinović, who, in conversation with the anti-government weekly *Vreme*, gives the following statement: "We need to take a look at", explains Vukadinović, "the fact that almost the fifth of voters (18.5 percent) has not yet decided who to vote for, or does not want to reveal that information – and whose votes are proportionally divided between all of the candidates, which, understandably, does not have to be the case. And only after that mathematical operation, for example Vučić's 44.7 percent becomes almost 55 percent... A possible opportunity for the oppositional candidates, as well as the hope for reaching the second round, hides in the possibility of a few hundred thousand, or even half a million 'new', or more precisely, disappointed and/or passive voters attending the elections. This is not a very probable scenario at this point. However, appearances on the political scene in the vein of Beli or this last disgusting attack on Nataša Jeremić (as a leader of a 'drug cartel'), that came from the headquarters of SPP and voice of Milenko Jovanov, present the unpredictable factors that could change the direction of the campaign in the last moment, mix the numbers and turn the disposition of the public. That is why – despite everything and no matter what – every elections, including the current ones, are in some degree unpredictable."<sup>34</sup>

Next to the dramatization of the electoral proceedings in the context of the possible and the desired unpredictable outcome, opposition can see their chance for the return on the political scene in the upcoming elections. Presidential elections, as the window of opportunity for the return of a part of the opposition, and the formation of new political parties, are the political motive for the articles of Jovana Gligorijević. The writing of this author is brimming with open cheering and representing the opposition

32 Dušan Pavlović, "Dobri su nam i Jeremić i Janković [Both Jeremić and Janković are good for us]," a talk with Olja Bečković, *NIN*, no. 1366, p. 12

33 Ibid, p. 14

34 Zora Drčelić, „Bitka za drugi krug [Battle for the second round]," *Vreme*, no. 1369, p. 11



as politically and morally superior actor in relation to the government. Political beliefs, ideological idiosyncrasies and open gesture of support of the author can be read in the spirit and the letter of her writing: "It is certain that after the elections two new movements will be born on the political scene: one led by Saša Janković, and the other by Vuk Jeremić. This theory is more than probable, since the both candidates have mobilized great number of activists, their headquarters practically already function as movements, so it is difficult to think than any of them will allow such energy to dissipate after the elections. Once again we repeat – no matter the results. In this sense, this is a chance for two political currents, not even so removed from each other, to make a head count, measure their actual power and scope, and, in this way, lead to the reorganization of the oppositional part of the political scene. At the same time, this is an opportunity for the revitalization of the so-called urban opposition, which has been in the rut, twitching and without a clear goal since 2012... For some of the old players this is a cathartic moment. By giving their support to Saša Janković, Democratic Party managed to scrap together a piece of the lost voter trust. And not only that, but it seems that DP has its confidence back, which was, next to finances, their biggest problem after the defeat in 2012, several inter party elections, and the exhaustion and bullying they were exposed to from their former president Boris Tadić... Vuk Jeremić. While in the case of Saša Janković a scenario in which the movement he started could go on without him is imaginable, in the case of Vuk Jeremić it is completely clear that his presidential candidature is a way for him to come back to the political scene and a realization of openly grand political ambitions. He too has succeeded in mobilizing significant 'manpower', so there is no doubt that after the elections we will see the formation of a new party. While Janković's supporters are ideologically mixed group brought together by a desire for a functional state, reigniting the trust of the citizens in state institutions and putting the collar on one man's power (which is, let us understand each other, a legitimate request), the possible political party lead by Vuk Jeremić is more precisely ideologically defined. It is clear that there we have right center, moderate nationalism and politics which we know from before as 'Both Kosovo and Europe'."<sup>35</sup>

Voting manual for the citizens that are not pro-regime; affirmation of the opposition, more precisely its candidates, according to the degree of their exposure to the negative campaign in pro-government media. The more aggressive you are, the more morally and politically exceptional you are. This is the message related by the article of Zora Drčelić, written three days before the Election Day. Obvious affirmation of the opposition, or, more precisely, clear example of the journalistic political cheering is visible in the following quote: "Do the citizens who will vote on these elections for one of the two most relevant opposition candidates Saša Janković and Vuk Jeremić, not according to the ratings, but driven by anger, hate and propaganda feces, that are unloaded on them daily in hundreds of kilograms of tabloid articles, even care about creating a new leader? Or perhaps those people would more like to see an organized team of responsible and conscientious people, who will not stand behind romantic mottos 'who can look you in the eyes', and then run each his own way?"<sup>36</sup>

The image of Serbia seen through the prism of the columns in the print media and weekly newspaper is an image of a highly polarized politic community, a society of confrontational interpretations of actors, events and political and historical, and broader, processes. Images of the key regime and oppositional actors are extremely negative, and in content they follow the previously determined political and media coordinates.

The electoral campaign demonstrated only in more detail and with greater intensity the negative image

35 Jovana Gligorijević, „Opozicija uzvraća udarac [The Opposition Strikes Back],“ *Vreme*, no. 1367, p. 5

36 Zora Drčelić, „Bitka za drugi krug [The Battle for the Second Round],“ *Vreme*, no. 1369, p. 13

of the political opponent in the eyes of his adversary. The continuity of negative articles on Aleksandar Vučić has already defined the deeply rooted stereotype of him as an actor, making each of his moves, decisions and initiatives morally and politically stigmatized in advance. At the same time, oppositional actors, even with the support from some of the "critical media", are also shown as not having political credibility and moral standing. Political life shown through the mirror of weekly newspapers is a dynamic and intensive battle of negative images of two actors. It shows an untraversable gap between them. A gap that makes Serbia almost a fatally divided society.

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About  
authors

## ABOUT AUTHORS

**Public Policy Institute** is a regional think-tank organization that operates in the Western Balkans region through the work of its branch offices in Belgrade, Podgorica and Ljubljana. By promoting public dialogue and constructive solutions, Public Policy Institute contributes to the efforts of the Western Balkan countries to become equal, reliable and progressive partners in the process of European integrations and mutual relationships. After the initial research and analysis of social and media context in the countries of the Western Balkans, the Institute has developed and implemented a series of media related projects, including: Role of the media in the process of securitisation in the Western Balkans, Civil Response to Clientelism in the media - MEDIA CIRCLE, NATO Reach Out - media monitoring and Role of the media in monitoring of R1325 in Montenegro.

**EBART Media Archive** is privately owned company established in 2000. Its main activity is archiving print media data in e-format. The print media archive consists of up-to-date material dating back to 2003, and more than 3 million print media reports from sources with national coverage. EBART is also specialized for media analysis, basic quantitative and qualitative analyses, comparing media treatment of specific keywords, as well as complex content analyses according to BBC methodology. EBART Media Archive is unmatched in the region with its unique media reports database, and 12 years of media research experience. This media database allows for the overall study of long-term media presence.

**Velimir Čurgus Kazimir** was born in Novi Sad in 1948. Since 2002, he is the director of the Ebart Media Archive, the unique media documentation center in Serbia. He was a journalist and editor of the cultural section of *Politika* newspapers from 1988 to 1996. He is one of the founders of the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia. He authored several books of prose and essays on culture and cultural policy. His works have been translated into English, French, German, Spanish, Polish and Japanese. He has won the International Prize for essay of the journal *Lettre Internationale* in Weimar in 2000. He's member of the Serbian PEN Center since 1987. He has edited several books on the relationship between politics and the media. He is author of several projects in the field of research, media and culture. He conducted studies of the media scene in Serbia and the influence of media on the political and social reality in particular.

**Isidora Jarić, PhD.** Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1970. Graduated and earned PhD at The Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Belgrade. Assistant Professor at Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology, University of Belgrade. Associate of The Institute of Sociology and Social Research, engaged in researching and examining global characteristics and transformations within Serbian society. Editor of two proceedings: *Bologna reform of higher education in Serbia: Problems, doubts, fears and expectations of the teaching staff at the University of Belgrade* (Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory Filip Višnjić and IP, Belgrade, 2010) and *Politics of Parenthood* (Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade, 2015).

**Danica Laban.** Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1976. She is media analyst, journalist and communicologist. Worked on numerous projects, which had represented visibility, training and research as its media components. She has collaborated with national and international organizations and institutions such as the Council of Europe (CAR project 2011 - 2012), UN Women (projects in the field of social – economic empowerment of women, 2012), the Office for Human and Minority Rights, NGO Praxis/ERT, HINT, NELI. She also worked on the evaluation of media for Strategic Marketing/IPSOS, for the purpose of the BBC Trust. In 2006 she founded Jigsaw Communication Agency, under which she operates today. During her career she was also a journalist and editor in RTS, BK TV and TV Politika.

**Dejan Vuk Stanković, PhD.** Born in Belgrade, Serbia in 1973. Graduated and earned PhD at The Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. Currently, he teaches philosophy, ethics and philosophy of education at The Teachers Training Faculty, University of Belgrade. From 2000 to 2003 he was scholar at the The Institute for Philosophy and Social studies. From 2004 to 2006, he worked for Marten Board International, a Serbian private company specialized for the market research and public polls. He was agency main pollster and political analyst. From 2006 until today, Dejan Vuk Stanković is an independent political analyst, comments political and social life in Serbia and region of Western Balkans for various TV and radio stations, as well as for print media.

### Data entry and processing

**Snežana Bajčeta**, PhD candidate, Faculty of Political Science

**Predrag Bajić**, PhD candidate, Faculty of Political Science

**Milica Oros**, graduated journalist, Faculty of Political Science

**Katarina Vukajlović**, graduated journalist, Faculty of Political Science

**Mina Dimitrovski**, graduated journalist, Faculty of Political Science



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